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PICTURE IMPERFECT: ATTEMPTED REGULATION OF
THE ART MARKET
PATTY GERSTENBLITH*
I. INTRODUCTION
In June 1984, the leading auction house of Sotheby Parke-Ber-
net sold a collection of 59 valuable and rare Jewish books and
manuscripts. The state of New York subsequently prosecuted
Sotheby's for misrepresentation and fraud in the conduct of this
sale, claiming that the true ownership of the collection was in
doubt and that Sotheby's had not revealed the questionable state
of the title to prospective purchasers.' A year later the parties set-
tled this suit by rescinding the sales and redistributing the auc-
tioned items without any finding of liability or fault.2
At about the same time that the suit against Sotheby's was set-
tled, it was revealed that the chairman of another leading auction
house, Christie's, had falsely reported the sale of two Impressionist
paintings at an auction held in 1981. As a result of this revelation
and in keeping with a settlement reached with the New York De-
* Assistant Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law; A.B., Bryn Mawr Col-
lege, 1971; Ph.D., Harvard University, 1977; J.D., Northwestern University School of Law,
1983. I want to express my appreciation to Professor Marshall Shapo of Northwestern Uni-
versity School of Law and Professor Wayne Lewis of DePaul University College of Law for
their helpful criticisms and suggestions and to acknowledge the support of the DePaul Uni-
versity College of Law Summer Research Grant program. I also want to thank Joyce Klouda
for her assistance in preparing this article.
1. Abrams v. Sotheby Parke-Bernet, Inc., No. 42255-84, slip op. at 2-5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug.
24, 1984) (granting motion for preliminary injunction). The Attorney General for the state
of New York obtained an order requiring Sotheby's to retain the proceeds of the auction to
the credit of the lawsuit and to retain any portions of the collection not already turned over
to the purchasers. Id., slip op. at 10.
2. Stipulation and Order of Settlement, Abrams v. Sotheby Parke-Bernet, Inc., No.
42255-84 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 16, 1985); McGill, Sotheby's To Recall Hebrew Books It Sold,
N.Y. Times, July 17, 1985, at C17, col. 1 (late ed.). See infra notes 121-26 and accompanying
text.
3. Cristallina S.A. v. Christie, Manson & Woods Int'l, 117 A.D.2d 284, 502 N.Y.S.2d 165
(1986); McGill, Sweeping Reassessment in the Auction Trade, N.Y. Times, July 31, 1985, at
Al, col. 4 (late ed:) [hereinafter McGill, Reassessment]; Christie's Chairman Quits London
Posts Over Lies on Sales, Wall St. J., July 22, 1985, at 2, col. 5; McGill, Christie's Chairman
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partment of Consumer Affairs, the chairman of Christie's New
York and London operations resigned his position and surrendered
his auction license for two years. The Department of Consumer Af-
fairs fined Christie's $80,000 and suspended the auction license of
the president of the New York branch for four months because he
had known of and perhaps assisted in the misrepresentation. 4 Fi-
nally, these and other recent controversies prompted the Depart-
ment to undertake a thorough review of auction house practices
with the goal of revising and strengthening the city's regulation of
the art market.'
These cases are but two recent examples that demonstrate that
the art world is far from immune to the problems of deception and
misrepresentation that characterize many commercial transactions
in our society today." These practices range from the artist who
intentionally misrepresents a modern work as that of an old
master 7 to the dealer who, either intentionally or unintentionally,
Quits in False Sale Case, N.Y. Times, July 20, 1985, at 1, col. 1 (late ed.) [hereinafter Mc-
Gill, False Sale Case]. See infra notes 148-73 and accompanying text.
4. Cristallina S.A., 117 A.D.2d at 295-96, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 173; Christie's Chairman Quits
London Posts Over Lies on Sales, supra note 3.
5. McGill, Reassessment, supra note 3. As a result of this review, in April 1987 the New
York City Department of Consumer Affairs announced new regulations primarily concerning
auction house practices with respect to setting and implementing reserve prices and identi-
fying auction items in which the dealer has an interest. CITY OF NE w YORK ADMIN. CODE tit.
20, ch. 2, sub ch. 13 (1987). Burnham, As the Stakes in the Art World Rise, So Do Laws
and Lawsuits, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1987, § 2 (Arts and Leisure), at 1, col. 2 (late ed.).
6. A discussion of the importance, even to the financial world, of the art market, which
boomed during the 1970s, may be found in 2 J. MERRYMAN & A. ELSEN, LAW, ETHICS AND THE
VIsuAL ARTS 478-83 (2d ed. 1987). Although the art market slumped during the early 1980s,
it has soared again since 1984, spurred by the bull market on Wall Street and investors
seeking new investments for their profits. Purchasers reportedly have paid at least double
the highest pre-auction estimates, and both Sotheby's and Christie's posted record sales and
profits in the 1984-1985 auction season. Benway, Full of Bull? When Wall Street Prospers,
Art Thrives, Barron's, June 23, 1986, at 8, col. 1. In the 1985-1986 season, Sotheby's re-
ported worldwide sales of nearly $700 million, and Christie's sales for the same year were
$536.8 million. At the same time, income from others involved in the art market was esti-
mated at $6 billion to $7 billion. Burnham, supra note 5, at 28, col. 3. Whether the art
market will suffer as a result of the 1987 stock market crash remains to be seen. If this
happens, however, such a decline likely will cause even more lawsuits by investors disap-
pointed because their art works did not retain their value.
7. The practice of copying old works or attempting to recreate the style of an older period
and then passing these off as originals goes back even to ancient times. See S. ARNAU,
THE ART OF THE FAKER THRETHOUSAND YEARS OF DECEPTION (1961); J. MERRYMAN &
A. ELSEN, supra note 6, at 551-62; S. SCHULLER, FORGERIES, DEALERS, EXPERTS (1960);
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misattributes a work and thereby concludes a more profitable sale.8
The owner of an art work who attempts to sell through an interme-
diary, as well as the prospective purchaser of such a work, is placed
in a market industry that operates under a set of highly technical
and somewhat arcane rules, and which is largely untouched by gov-
ernmental interference or regulation. This Article explores whether
such owners and purchasers receive adequate legal protection and,
if not, whether a unifying legal theory can be proposed to provide
better protection for both owners and purchasers of art works.
Examples of possibly abusive practices and the scientific, stylis-
tic, and analytical techniques by which such abuses are detected
T. WURTENBURGER, ASPECTS OF ART FORGERY (1962); Hodes, "Fake" Art and the Law, 27
FED. B.J. 73 (1967).
8. Such misattribution presents a complicated legal issue because correct attribution is
often virtually impossible if the artist is no longer living and so cannot verify the work in
person. The older the work of art, the more technical and less certain the process of identifi-
cation often becomes.
When dealing with antiquities, two particular additional problems arise. First, an object
may be genuinely "ancient" and yet be misdated by several hundred years. To what extent
does this constitute a misattribution, and does this standard vary depending on the pur-
chaser's sophistication and status as an expert? For example, pottery of the Near East is
often misattributed to the Iron Age (ca. 1000-600 B.C.) when it is in fact Roman or early
Byzantine (ca. 100-600 A.D.). To the lay collector, this discrepancy may make little differ-
ence, but to the expert it can be very significant. On the other hand, the expert should be
aware of the likelihood of misattribution and therefore may not have reasonably relied on
the dealer's representation. This problem is further exacerbated by the frequent inability of
experts and scholars to agree on the authenticity and sometimes the date of ancient objects,
as exemplified by the controversy surrounding the authenticity of a kouros (statue of a na-
ked youth) attributed to the sixth century B.C. and acquired by the J. Paul Getty Museum
for a reported $7 million. Russell, Disputed Greek Statue To Go on Exhibition, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 12, 1986, at Al, col. 2 (late ed.). The Metropolitan Museum of Art had to remove from
exhibition an Egyptian sculpture of a cat, which had been on display for nearly 25 years,
because it may be a forgery. McGill, Met Says Its Popular Cat Is Probably Fake, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 30, 1987, at Al, col. 4 (late ed.). See also Hahn v. Duveen, 133 Misc. 871, 234
N.Y.S. 185 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1929) (plaintiff's suit for slander of title against expert who stated
that plaintiff's painting was not an original Leonardo da Vinci was properly submitted to
the jury when other experts testified to the painting's authenticity).
Second, many archaeological objects, particularly those on the market in the United
States or Europe, have been removed from their country of origin illegally. Although these
objects often can enter the United States legally, the original illegality may present an ethi-
cal concern to the purchaser or, in some instances, may lead to considerable international
pressure on the purchaser to return the object to its country of origin. See infra note 119
and accompanying text. The "pedigree" (consisting of the attribution, authentication, and
provenance) the seller gives the object can be crucial in establishing both its legality and the
state of its title. To what extent should the seller then be liable for an incorrect pedigree?
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are too many to enumerate and have been dealt with extensively in
recent legal literature.' This study therefore is limited to a consid-
eration of current practices in the art market and the resulting lia-
bilities of auction houses and art dealers to both the purchaser and
the owner of works of art. The process of identification and au-
thentication of works of art may result in liability to the purchaser
under various legal theories if this identification later proves to be
incorrect. This Article first considers the liability of an art
merchant to the buyer for the sale of an incorrectly identified work
of art and for the sale of a work of art to which the owner did not
have good title under common law tort and contract theories,
under statutory schemes, and under a system of voluntary self reg-
ulation. Second, the duties and potential liabilities of the art
merchant to the owner or creator of the work of art are examined.
Finally, this Article focuses on whether these various legal theories
provide adequate protection for the consumer (both buyer and
owner) and on the effect of providing additional protection
through different theoretical models to be proposed.
II. DUTIES TO THE PURCHASER
A. Misrepresentation and Warranty Theories
1. Common Law Remedies
Sprinkled through American and English case histories are a few
decisions that confront the issues of the liability of a broker, auc-
tioneer, or dealer 10 who sells an incorrectly attributed work of art.
9. See, e.g., DuBoff, Controlling the Artful Con: Authentication and Regulation, 27 HAs-
TINGS L.J. 973, 974-97 (1976); Wurtenberger, Criminal Damage to Art-A Criminological
Study, 14 DEPAUL L. REv. 83 (1964); Comment, Art Forgery: The Art Market and Legal
Considerations, 7 NovA L.J. 315, 319-27 (1983) [hereinafter Comment, Art Forgery]; Com-
ment, The Uniform Commercial Code Warranty Provisions and the Theory of Strict Lia-
bility in Tort as Solutions to Art Counterfeiting in Painting: A Critical Analysis, 20 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 531, 533-36 (1976) [hereinafter Comment, U.C.C. Warranty Provisions]; Com-
ment, Current Practices and Problems in Combatting Illegality in the Art Market, 12 SE-
TON HALL L. REv. 506, 507-18 (1982) [hereinafter Comment, Current Practices]; Comment,
Legal Control of the Fabrication and Marketing of Fake Paintings, 24 STAN. L. REv. 930,
930-37 (1972).
10. Brokers, dealers, and auctioneers are distinguished in the law, although common us-
age of these terms often makes them synonymous. Black's Law Dictionary defines an auc-
tioneer as "[a] person authorized or licensed by law to sell lands or goods of other persons at
public auction ... for another on commission, or for a recompense." BLACK'S LAW DicwION-
[Vol. 29:501
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The legal theory underlying these suits is a mixture of tort and
contract law. The disappointed buyer usually sues the seller either
on the grounds of fraud and misrepresentation 1 or for breach of
the "warranty"' 2 that the seller gives to the purchaser. These dif-
ARY 119 (5th ed. 1979). As between auctioneers and brokers, the former is entitled only to
sell whereas the latter may both buy and sell. Id. A dealer is defined as "one who buys to
sell; not one who buys to keep, or makes to sell." Id. at 359. Finally, a broker is defined as
"[a]n agent employed to make bargains and contracts for a compensation." Id. at 174. Auc-
tioneers and brokers are subject to the laws of agency. The RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY states
that agency is "the fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of consent by one
person [principal] to another [agent] that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his
control, and consent by the other so to act." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1957).
See Brown & Zortman Machinery Co. v. City of Pittsburgh, 375 Pa. 250, 100 A.2d 98 (1953)
for a discussion of brokers contrasted with dealers. For further discussion of auctioneers,
brokers, and dealers, see Sawyer Realty Group, Inc. v. Jarvis Corp., 89 M. 2d 379, 432
N.E.2d 849 (1982) and cases cited therein. See also Knudson v. Weeks, 394 F. Supp. 963
(W.D. Okla. 1975) (detailing a broker's special agency relationship to the principal in a real
estate transaction); Randall v. Lautenberger, 16 R.I. 158, 13 A. 100 (1888) (discussing an
auctioneer's fiduciary duty not to bid against the principal). In an attempt to avoid confu-
sion, the term "seller" is used in this Article to denote generically "dealer," "auctioneer,"
and "broker." Owner, artist, or consignor is used, as appropriate, to refer to the person on
whose behalf the seller has undertaken to sell the particular item.
11. A common law cause of action for fraud generally requires proof of several elements,
which have been variously stated in different judicial opinions. These elements include: (1) a
representation regarding a material fact; (2) a false representation; (3) the speaker's belief
that the representation was not true; (4) the speaker's intent that the false representation
be acted upon (intent is also known as scienter); (5) the plaintiff's justifiable reliance on the
representation to his or her detriment; and (6) the plaintiff's lack of awareness that the
representation was false and reasonable belief that it was true. Gee v. CBS, Inc., 471 F.
Supp. 600, 622 (E.D. Pa. 1979). See L. Loss, SEcusrims REGULATION 1431 (2d ed. 1961).
Misrepresentation is an element of fraud; however, depending on the court, this term is
often used interchangeably with fraud as the name for the cause of action. See Shores v.
Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 468 (5th Cir. 1981).
12. The word "warranty" is used cautiously here because the principle issue litigated is
usually whether the seller in fact gave the buyer a warranty or merely an expression of
opinion. See infra notes 13-26 and accompanying text. A warranty may be defined in a
commercial setting as "[a] promise or agreement by seller that [an] article sold has certain
qualities or that seller has good title thereto." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1423 (5th ed. 1979).
One court has stated that "a warranty amounts to a promise to indemnify the promisee for
any loss if the fact warranted proves untrue. . . .[I]t is intended precisely to relieve the
promisee of any duty to ascertain the facts for himself." Dale Constr. Co. v. United States,
168 Ct. Cl. 692, 699 (1964). Specific statutory law covering warranties can be found in the
U.C.C. §§ 2-312 to -318 (1978). See infra notes 50-81, 110-13 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the U.C.C.'s applicability and relative ineffectiveness in the art market. A dis-
cussion of warranties applicable during an auction, especially the warranty of title, can be
found in Gould v. Hiram Walker & Sons, 142 F.2d 544 (7th Cir. 1944). This decision.sets out
the duty of a purchaser at auction to investigate the title when warranties are disclaimed.
Id. at 547.
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ferent doctrinal bases, rooted in both tort and contract notions, are
seldom clearly distinguished by the courts.
The decision in Jendwine v. Slade, 3 perhaps the oldest reported
case on this subject, established the traditional approach to this
issue. The defendant sold the plaintiff two paintings as originals,
but they were actually copies. The plaintiff sued for fraud, and the
court addressed the question whether the appearance of the art-
ist's name in a catalog constituted a warranty or merely a descrip-
tion and opinion on which the buyer was not intended to rely. The
court held that the catalog did not constitute a warranty because
the artist had lived so long ago it was not possible to ascertain
whether the paintings were originals. The catalog indicated only
the seller's opinion that the works were originals, and the buyer
was to exercise independent judgment. The court concluded that
"if the seller only represents what he himself believes, he can be
guilty of no fraud. 1 4 Jendwine thus focused on whether the seller
had made an express warranty to the buyer or had merely repre-
sented an opinion. The court held that if the representation was
one of opinion, then the seller committed no fraud as long as the
seller actually believed in the truth of the statement. 5
In two later decisions, Lomi v. Tucker" and De Sewhanberg v.
Buchanan,7 the courts held that if the seller's representations
formed an express warranty, then the buyer could either rescind
the sale or keep the painting and pay the seller only what the jury
thought the copies were worth.'8 In Pennell v. Woodburn,'9 when
the seller warranted a painting to the purchaser and the purchaser
resold it to a subsequent buyer, the second purchaser sued the first
on the warranty and recovered costs. The first purchaser was then
13. 170 Eng. Rep. 459 (1797).
14. Id. at 460.
15. Id.
16. 172 Eng. Rep. 586 (1829).
17. 172 Eng. Rep. 1004 (1832).
18. Lomi, 172 Eng. Rep. at 586-87; De Sewhanberg, 172 Eng. Rep. at 1005. One would
expect that the buyer generally would be satisfied with rescission of the sale. However, in
Menzel v. List, 24 N.Y.2d 91, 246 N.E.2d 742, 298 N.Y.S.2d 979 (1969), which involved
breach of the warranty of title, the buyer sought and received the benefit of the bargain. See
infra notes 114-20 and accompanying text.
19. 173 Eng. Rep. 52 (1835).
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allowed to recover from the seller all the costs of this action by the
second purchaser.20
Finally, in Power v. BarhaM,21 the court held that the decision
whether a statement constituted a warranty or expression of opin-
ion was correctly left to the jury. In this case, at the time of sale
the seller gave the buyer a receipt stating: "Four pictures, Views in
Venice, Canaletto, 1601. ''22 The jury found that the buyer had con-
tracted for paintings by Canaletto and that this receipt was there-
fore a warranty, not a mere description or statement of opinion.
The buyer's evidence of a written receipt constituted an express
warranty although given to the buyer only at the conclusion of the
sale .2 This result differs from that in Jendwine, in which a cata-
log, which the buyer studies before a sale, was held not to consti-
tute a warranty.24
The court in Power distinguished the result in Jendwine because
in Power the artist had died relatively recently, so that the seller
should have been able to ascertain the paintings' origin. In
Jendwine, however, the greater amount of time since the artist's
death made this impossible.26 Thus, in order to recover under the
common law, a disappointed purchaser must establish that the
seller's statement constituted an express warranty, rather than a
mere expression of opinion, and that the seller knew at the time of
sale that the statement was false. These early English decisions
summarize the dependence of the common law approach on the
distinction between opinion and warranty.
2. Statutory Regulation
New York is the recognized capital of the art market in the
Western Hemisphere and the home of many of the largest, most
prestigious auction houses. Largely in response to revelations con-
20. Id. at 52.
21. 111 Eng. Rep. 865 (1836).
22. Id. at 865.
23. Id. at 866.
24. Id. Jendwine v. Slade, 170 Eng. Rep. 459, 459-60 (1797).
25. Power, 111 Eng. Rep. at 866.
26. Jendwine, 170 Eng. Rep. at 459. The difference in time from the artists' deaths to the
time of suit, however, was not that great: in Jendwine, a little over 100 years; in Power, 68
years.
19881
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cerning various art auction house and dealer practices and the ap-
parent inadequacy of common law contract and tort theories, New
York has attempted to police these practices through various regu-
latory schemes. The state now has a comprehensive statutory
scheme that attempts to regulate several facets of the art market.1
7
Perhaps the first statute to be utilized in regulating the art mar-
ket was the New York Sales Act.28 In Weisz v. Parke-Bernet Gal-
leries, Inc.,29 the court considered a claim regarding an express
warranty as to the authenticity of two paintings. Mr. Weisz and
Mrs. Schwartz purchased paintings in 1961 and 1964, respectively.
The paintings were listed in the Parke-Bernet catalog as works of
Raoul Dufy. Several years later the District Attorney's office dis-
covered that they were fakes and informed the purchasers. The
purchasers sued Parke-Bernet, claiming that the catalog listing
constituted an express warranty as defined by the Sales Act.30
Parke-Bernet defended on the grounds that the conditions of sale
in the catalog included a disclaimer of warranty as to genuineness
and authorship.31 Two issues were presented: whether the plaintiffs
knew or should have known of the disclaimer, and if so, whether
the disclaimer was effective.32
The trial court concluded that Mr. Weisz had had no knowledge
of the disclaimer and that he could not be charged legally with
such knowledge." In contrast, the court found that Mrs. Schwartz
did have actual knowledge,3 4 but that the disclaimer was ineffec-
27. See infra notes 82-92 and accompanying text.
28. New York Sales Act, N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW §§ 82-158 (McKinney 1962).
29. 67 Misc. 2d 1077, 325 N.Y.S.2d 576 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1971), rev'd, 77 Misc. 2d 80, 351
N.Y.S.2d 911 (N.Y. App. Term 1974).
30. Weisz, 67 Misc. 2d at 1078, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 578. The New York Sales Act defined an
express warranty as follows:
Any affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller relating to the goods is an
express warranty if the natural tendency of such affirmation or promise is to
induce the buyer to purchase the goods, and if the buyer purchases the goods
relying thereon. No affirmation of the value of the goods, nor any statement
purporting to be a statement of the seller's opinion only shall be construed as a
warranty.
N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 93 (McKinney 1962).
31. Weisz, 67 Misc. 2d at 1079, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 578-79.
32. Id. at 1079, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 579.
33. Id. at 1080, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 580.
34. Id. at 1081, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 581.
508 [Vol. 29:501
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tives5 because Parke-Bernet had intended the plaintiffs to rely on
its superior knowledge and experience and the catalog had been
designed to encourage such reliance and belief in the works' au-
thenticity.3 6 The court found that Parke-Bernet had failed to an-
nounce and emphasize the disclaimer sufficiently, particularly be-
cause the auctioneer had not singled out the specific disclaimer at
the beginning of the auction.37 The court said it was attempting to
act "consistently with a whole body of law that reflects an increas-
ing sensitivity to the requirements of fair dealing where there is a
relationship between parties in which there is a basic inequality of
knowledge, expertness, or economic power."3 " The trial court im-
posed an almost absolute liability on the auction house, requiring
it to compensate the purchaser simply because it was theoretically
in a position of superior knowledge to ascertain the authenticity of
a work of art and the purchaser had relied on that expertise. This
absolute liability was imposed even though, at the time of sale,
Parke-Bernet had believed that the paintings were genuine.3 9
The appellate court, in reversing this decision, relied on three
factors. First, at the time of sale, neither the common law nor the
Sales Act in effect at the time of the auctions recognized that the
stated opinion of the seller gave rise to an express warranty of au-
thenticity or authorship. Second, Parke-Bernet had clearly and un-
equivocally disclaimed any express or implied warranty or repre-
sentation of the paintings' authenticity as products of the ascribed
artist. Third, the court found no fraud or misrepresentation be-
cause Parke-Bernet had not wilfully intended to deceive; rather
the purchasers had assumed the risk that the identifications might
be wrong.40 The court concluded that the purchasers "will not now
be heard to complain that, in failing to act with the caution of one
in circumstances abounding with signals of caveat emptor, they
35. Id. at 1082, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 582.'
36. Id. at 1081-82, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 581.
37. Id. The court stated: "Where one party in a contractual relationship occupies a posi-
tion of superior knowledge and experience, and where that superior knowledge is relied
upon and intended to be relied upon by the other, surely more is required for an effective
disclaimer than appears here." Id. at 1082, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 581.
38. Id. at 1082, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 582.
39. Id. at 1079, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 578.
40. Weisz v. Parke-Bernet, 77 Misc. 2d 80, 81, 351 N.Y.S.2d 911, 912 (N.Y. App. Term
1974).
1988]
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made a bad bargain."'41 This decision essentially adopts the com-
mon law analysis of Jendwine v. Slade, with its emphasis on the
distinction between a warranty and an opinion and its reliance on
the doctrine of caveat emptor.42
In Vom Lehn v. Astor Art Galleries, Ltd.,43 the court attempted
to avoid the common law doctrines of deceit and misrepresentation
and provide some relief to a plaintiff when the circumstances were
particularly unconscionable. In this case, the plaintiffs agreed to
purchase for $67,000 twenty jade carvings, which the seller repre-
sented as hand-carved and of the Ming Dynasty period.44 The
carvings were, in fact, neither and had a value of approximately
$15,000. 41 The court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims on the basis of
fraudulent misrepresentation because they had failed to request a
complete description of the carvings in the bill of sale and ap-
praisal.46 Relying on section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial
Code (U.C.C.), the court refused to enforce the remainder of the
contract, which called for further payments, on the ground that the
price charged was unconscionable. The court could not, however,
award any damages under this provision. 1
Nonetheless, the court held that under New York's Home Solici-
tation Sales Act, the plaintiffs could repudiate the entire sale,
thereby recovering their down payment and costs. 48 Because the
defendant had failed to inform the buyers of their right of rescis-
sion, the court held that the buyers could cancel at any reasonable
time by notifying the seller of this intention. The plaintiffs thereby
attained a full rescission of the sale without establishing any claim
41. Id. at 81, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 912.
42. See Jendwine v. Slade, 170 Eng. Rep. 459 (1797).
43. 86 Misc. 2d 1, 380 N.Y.S.2d 532 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976).
44. Id. at 2-5, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 534-36.
45. Id. at 7, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 538.
46. Id. at 8-10, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 539-40.
47. Id. at 11, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 541.
48. Id. at 12, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 541-42; N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW §§ 425-30 (McKinney Supp.
1975-1976) amended by N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW §§ 425-31 (McKinney Supp. 1987). The
Home Solicitation Sales Act applied because the sale was concluded at a place other than
the defendant's place of business. Section 428 of the Act requires the seller to inform the
buyer of the right to rescind a sale made at a place other than the seller's place of business
within three days of the transaction. If the seller fails to give the buyer the appropriate
notice, the buyer may cancel the sale at any time until the seller complies with the notice
requirement. Id. § 428.
510 [Vol. 29:501
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for fraud or misrepresentation.49 Because of its limited application
to sales concluded at places other than the seller's place of busi-
ness, the Home Solicitation Sales Act provides little precedent or
protection for future buyers who rely on a seller's statement
(whether opinion or representation) as to the nature and quality of
a work of art.
The U.C.C. embodies an integrated statutory framework for the
regulation of the sale of goods. Although virtually no reported
cases interpret the application of the U.C.C. to the sale of art
works, considerable disagreement has flourished among legal schol-
ars as to whether the U.C.C. affords adequate protection to the
purchaser of a misattributed or forged work of art.50 One opinion is
that "the warranty provisions of the Code protect consumers of art
both from the seller who intentionally misrepresents a forged piece
as an original, and from the art dealer who innocently sells what he
believes to be an authentic work of art."51 Other commentators,
however, dispute the applicability of the Code to improve in any
significant way the dilemma of the disappointed buyer under pre-
Code law.52
Consumer protection lies primarily in the express warranty pro-
visions of section 2-313. Implied warranties are set out in sections
2-314 and 2-315 and disclaimers of warranties are regulated by sec-
tion 2-316. The question of the adequacy of the U.C.C. centers ini-
tially on the problems involved in proving the creation of an ex-
press warranty and the purposes and motivations of the consumer
who purchases a work of art. Section 2-313 provides that an ex-
press warranty may be created by "[a]ny affirmation of fact or
49. 86 Misc. 2d at 11-12, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 541-43. Whether the sellers in Vom Lehn knew
that the pieces were not hand-carved Ming Dynasty jades was never clearly established,
whereas in Weisz, Parke-Bernet certainly did not know that the paintings were forgeries at
the time of sale. Weisz, 77 Misc. 2d at 81, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 912. If the facts of Vom Lehn had
not involved a home solicitation, the plaintiffs, like those in Weisz, probably would have
failed to recover the purchase price, and under far more suspicious circumstances than those
in Weisz.
50. 2 F. FELDMAN & S. WEIL, ART LAW: RIGHT AND LIABuITms oF CREATORS & COLLECTORS
4-6 (1986) [hereinafter F. FELDMAN & S. WEIL, ART LAW]; F. FELDMAN & S. WEIL, ART
WORKS: LAW, POLICY, PRACTICE, 287-88 (1974) [hereinafter F. FELDMAN & S. WEIL, ART
WORKS].
51. Note, Uniform Commercial Code Warranty Solutions to Art Fraud and Forgery, 14
WM. & MARY L. REv. 409, 414 (1972).
52. See infra notes 56-81 and accompanying text.
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promise . . . which relates to the goods and becomes part of the
basis of the bargain ' 53 by description,54 or by sample or model.
55
Several problems arise in the application of section 2-313 to the
sales of art works.
The first problem of interpretation is whether the buyer must
show reliance on the seller's statements in order to prove the crea-
tion of an express warranty. This issue depends, in turn, on the
interpretation of the requirement that the affirmation or descrip-
tion become "part of the basis of the bargain." Considerable disa-
greement exists as to whether this formulation embodies the pre-
Code requirement that the buyer relied in fact on the seller's state-
ments in consummating the sale or whether the Code eliminates
the reliance requirement.5 " Comment 3 to section 2-313 seems to
eliminate the reliance requirement. 57 Several cases and commenta-
tors nevertheless have concluded that the "basis of the bargain"
test is little more than a reformulation of the pre-Code reliance
requirement. The authority for this conclusion stems primarily
from the statement in comment 1 that express warranties "rest on
'dickered' aspects of the individual bargain."58 If reliance is a re-
quired element of the buyer's claim, then presumably sophisticated
purchasers, such as museums and major collectors, who have rela-
tively equal access to information and a relatively equal bargaining
position with sellers of art works, would not be able to establish an
express warranty.
Even if the element of reliance can be established, or if it is not
considered necessary, the disappointed buyer will have a more sig-
nificant hurdle to overcome. Section 2-313(2) provides that "an af-
53. U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(a) (1978).
54. Id. § 2-313(1)(b).
55. Id. § 2-313(1)(c). This last provision probably would not apply to sales of art works.
56. Comment, U.C.C. Warranty Provisions, supra note 9, at 538-40.
57. Comment 3 states: "[N]o particular reliance on [affirmations of fact] need be shown in
order to weave them into the fabric of the agreement." U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 3.
58. Id. comment 3; Comment, U.C.C. Warranty Provisions, supra note 9, at 539-40 & nn.
57, 60-64. Some commentators, of course, disagree with this conclusion. See, e.g., Du Boff,
supra note 9, at 1005-07 (reliance requirement eliminated but only in face-to-face negotia-
tions; buyer must, however, show awareness of seller's statements); Hobart, A Giant Step
Forward - New York Legislation on Sales of Fine Art Multiples, 7 ART & THE LAW 261,
274-75 (1983) (§ 2-313 eliminates proof of seller's scienter, intent to deceive, and buyer's
reliance).
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firmation merely of the value of the goods or a statement purport-
ing to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the goods
does not create a warranty. ' 59 This latter provision excludes "puff-
ery" or statements of the seller's opinion or judgment.6 0 Unfortu-
nately, this omission seems to return to the common law distinc-
tion considered in Jendwine v. Slade and Power v. Barham.61 Any
seller could attempt to evade liability for the lack of authenticity
of a work of art by claiming that the statement of authorship was
an opinion rather than a warranty. Although ordinarily the
description of a painting as "a Picasso" would constitute the core
description,62 several technical terms often used in catalog descrip-
tions sound similar but probably would not create an express war-
ranty that a painting was in fact executed by Picasso. 3 Because
the authorship of a work by a deceased artist can never be ascer-
tained with absolute certainty, any statement by a seller can be
characterized as an opinion. 4 An excellent argument can be made
that when the seller's statement increases the purchase price of an
art work, even if such statement is considered to be merely an
opinion, the seller should bear the burden if that opinion turns out
to be incorrect. 5 Nonetheless, considerable disagreement remains
59. U.C.C. § 2-313(2).
60. Note, supra note 56, at 418.
61. Jendwine, 170 Eng. Rep. at 460; Power, 111 Eng. Rep. at 865; see supra notes 13-15,
21-26 and accompanying text.
62. Note, supra note 51, at 415, 420-22. This comment relies in part on the lower court
decision in Weisz v. Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc., 67 Misc. 2d 1077, 325 N.Y.S.2d 576 (N.Y.
Civ. Ct 1972), rev'd, 77 Misc. 2d 80, 351 N.Y.S.2d 911 (N.Y. App. Term 1974), which was
subsequently reversed. See supra notes 29-39 and accompanying text. Furthermore, the au-
thor's statement that a general disclaimer of an express warranty, such as that contained in
an auction sale catalog, is not valid is also based on this lower court decision.
63. In light of the industry's historical use of such technical terms as "attribution,"
"school," and "circle"--now partially codified in New York by statute, see, e.g., infra note
89-a description of a painting using such terms might be considered ambiguous. Du Boff,
supra note 9, at 1003; Comment, Current Practices, supra note 9, at 556. Even the presence
or absence of the artist's first name has been used in catalog descriptions to indicate differ-
ences in the degree of certainty of an attribution. Note, supra note 51, at 424-25, n.77.
64. Du Boff, supra note 9, at 1004-05; Comment, U.C.C. Warranty Provisions, supra note
9, at 541-42; Comment, Current Practices, supra note 9, at 557. Du Boff suggests that if
both the seller and the buyer assumed that the work of art was authentic and this fact was
part of the basis of the bargain, then the buyer should be entitled to rescission based on a
mutual mistake of fact. Id. at 1005, n.162.
65. Comment, Art Forgery, supra note 9, at 332-33; Comment, Current Practices, supra
note 9, at 557; Note, supra note 51, at 417.
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as to whether this analysis of section 2-313 ultimately will be ap-
plied to sales of art works.
The implied warranty of merchantability in section 2-314 is
probably of limited application to the sale of art works.6 Although
this implied warranty pertains to the seller who is innocent of any
knowledge of a defect or the item's failure to conform to a stan-
dard of merchantability and applies even when the seller cannot
discover the defect or failure, undocumented works probably would
not be covered, particularly if they have been traded in the art
market for any significant period of time without detection of their
lack of authenticity.6 7 Furthermore, this type of implied warranty
applies only when the seller satisfies the U.C.C.'s definition of a
"merchant with respect to goods of that kind."6 8 A private collec-
tor or museum that engages in only sporadic sales of art works
would not qualify as such, and the label might even be restricted
to a dealer or auctioneer who regularly deals in works of a particu-
lar period or artist.69 An even more significant consideration is the
determination of what constitutes the "ordinary purposes for
which such goods are used. '7 0 If the purpose of ownership of a
work of art rests in the enjoyment of its general aesthetic value,
rather than in the idiosyncratic value of the ownership of a partic-
ular work by a specific artist, then even a misattributed or forged
work of art may fit the ordinary purposes for which such goods are
used.7'
Finally, the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, set out
in section 2-315, rarely applies to the sale of art works because the
particular purpose must be more than simply the desire to own a
particular work by a particular artist.72 Only if the purpose of the
66. Note, supra note 51, at 422-27.
67. Du Boff, supra note 9, at 1013.
68. U.C.C. § 2-314(1) (1978). Section 2-104(1) defines a "merchant" as one "who deals in
goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or
skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction ... ." Id. § 2-104(1).
69. Comment, U.C.C. Warranty Provisions, supra note 9, at 546.
70. U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c).
71. Comment, Art Forgery, supra note 9, at 336-37; Comment, U.C.C. Warranty Provi-
sions, supra note 9, at 546-47. Contra Note, supra note 51, at 425 (forgeries would defeat
the buyer's purpose in purchasing an original and would not be "honestly resalable" as re-
quired by U.C.C. § 2-314 comment 8).
72. Note, supra note 51, at 427-28.
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purchase was to make a particular investment or gift or to com-
plete a specific collection would the requirement of "particular
purpose" be satisfied."3
The U.C.C. also provides for and limits the disclaimer of warran-
ties by the seller of goods. Section 2-316(1), concerning the dis-
claimer of express warranties, provides that the "negation or limi-
tation [of an express warranty] is inoperative to the extent that
such construction is unreasonable. 74 The foundation of an express
warranty is arguably the "core description" or "quality of the sub-
ject matter of the sale to which the seller's performance must nec-
essarily conform. '7 5 This warranty may not be abrogated and it
applies even to the seller who acts in good faith and without any
knowledge of forgery or misattribution. 6 An express warranty also
is not excluded by the buyer's inspection or failure to inspect.
However, low price, lack of adequate documentation, particularly
poor execution of a forged art work, or the seller's demand that the
buyer inspect the art work may put the buyer on notice that he or
she is assuming the risk of defects that an examination would re-
veal. 7 Given the difficulty of establishing that the seller's state-
ments created an express warranty, such limitations on disclaimers
seem to afford the buyer little additional protection. 8
Section 2-316(2) limits disclaimers of implied warranties, again
to protect the buyer from surprise, by requiring specific language
and conspicuousness in a disclaimer..7  These limitations seem to
apply to sales of art works, just as to sales of other types of goods,
73. Id. at 428; Du Boff, supra note 9, at 1014; Comment, Art Forgery, supra note 9, at
335-36; Comment, U.C.C. Warranty Provisions, supra note 9, at 547-49.
74. U.C.C. § 2-316(1).
75. Note, supra note 51, at 415. See also Comment, Current Practices, supra note 9, at
557-58 (a general disclaimer of express warranties is likely to be considered ineffective).
76. Comment 1 to § 2-316 states that the purpose of this provision is "to protect a buyer
from unexpected and unbargained language of disclaimer by denying effect to such language
when inconsistent with language of express warranty. . ." U.C.C. § 2-316 comment 1.
77. U.C.C. § 2-316 comment 8; Comment, U.C.C. Warranty Provisions, supra note 9, at
551 (which defects are excluded depends on the skill of the buyer and the buyer's opportu-
nity to conduct sophisticated tests).
78. Du Boff, supra note 9, at 1010; Comment, Art Forgery, supra note 9, at 334; Com-
ment, U.C.C. Warranty Provisions, supra note 9, at 549-50.
79. U.C.C. § 2-316(2).
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if the buyer can establish that an implied warranty was created."s
The U.C.C. also permits the parties to an agreement, in cases of
pure commercial loss, to limit the measure of damages when such a
limitation is not unconscionable. For example, the buyer's reme-
dies may be limited to return of the goods and refund of the
purchase price."'
In 1966, New York enacted its comprehensive Arts and Cultural
Affairs Law to supplement the U.C.C. and to confront the specific
problems posed by the art market industry.8 2 Michigan subse-
quently enacted a statute substantially similar to the New York
statute, at least as far as this aspect of the art market is con-
cerned. 3 The first difference between the New York statute and
the U.C.C. concerns the creation of an express warranty. Section
13.01(1) of the New York law specifically provides that whenever
an art merchant gives a buyer who is not an art merchant a written
statement concerning the authorship of a work of art, this state-
ment is presumed to be part of the basis of the bargain and creates
an express warranty. 4 The Michigan statute's definition of an ex-
80. Comment, U.C.C. Warranty Provisions, supra note 9, at 550. Some commentators
have remarked on the relative ease with which implied warranties may be disclaimed. Du
Boff, supra note 9, at 1015; Hobart, supra note 58, at 276.
81. U.C.C. § 2-719(1)(a). As is discussed infra notes 140-47 and accompanying text, courts
do not necessarily honor the limitations set out in auction house catalogs. U.C.C. § 2-719(2)
provides that when a limited remedy fails of its essential purpose, additional remedies may
be allowed under other provisions of the Code.
82. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW §§ 11.01-15.21 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1988). Other
provisions of this statute regulate the relationship between the artist and the dealer and
protect the artist's copyright interests. See Comment, Regulation of the New York Art Mar-
ket: Has the Legislature Painted Dealers into a Corner? 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 939, 940-53
(1978).
83. MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. §§ 442.321-.325 (West Supp. 1987). For a discussion of the
Michigan statute, see Du Boff, supra note 9, at 1011-12.
84. Section 13.01 states:
1. Whenever an art merchant, in selling or exchanging a work of fine art, fur-
nishes to a buyer of such work who is not an art merchant a certificate of
authenticity or any similar written instrument it:
(a) shall be presumed to be part of the basis of the bargain; and
(b) shall create an express warranty for the material facts stated as of the
date of such sale or exchange.
N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 13.01 (McKinney Supp. 1988).
Section 11.01(2) defines an art merchant as
a person who is in the business of dealing, exclusively or non-exclusively, in
works of fine art or multiples, or a person who by his occupation holds himself
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press warranty goes even further in that it eliminates much of the
ambiguity involved in the determination of whether a statement
constitutes an expression of opinion or a warranty. It accomplishes
this by providing that a writing creates a warranty even if the art
merchant did not intend to do so or if a statement relating to au-
thorship is "merely the art merchant's opinion. '8 5 Perhaps the
most significant element of the Michigan statute pertaining to the
creation of an express warranty is that a "written instrument" in-
ludes not only a bill of sale or memorandum but also "a written or
printed catalog or other prospectus of a forthcoming sale." '
Although both New York and Michigan statutes permit this ex-
press warranty to be disclaimed under a provision similar to U.C.C.
section 2-316(1), for the disclaimer to be considered reasonable it
must be written and conspicuous; under the New York statute the
disclaimer must specifically inform the buyer that "the seller as-
out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to such works, or to whom such
knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employment of an agent or other
intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out as having such knowl-
edge or skill.
Id. § 11.01(2).
This definition specifically includes an auctioneer who sells art works at public auction. Sec-
tion 11.01(6) defines a certificate of authenticity as a "written statement by an art merchant
confirming, approving or attesting to the authorship of a work of fine art or multiple, which
is capable of being used to the advantage or disadvantage of some person." Id. § 11.01(6).
85. Section 442.322(2)(a) of the Michigan statute states:
When an art merchant, in selling or exchanging a work of fine art, furnishes to
a buyer of such work who is not an art merchant, a written instrument which,
in describing the work, identifies it with any author or authorship, the descrip-
tion shall be presumed to be part of the basis of the bargain and shall create
an express warranty of the authenticity of the authorship as of the date of the
sale or exchange. The warranty shall not be negated or limited because the art
merchant in the written instrument did not use formal words such as "war-
rant" or "guarantee" or because he did not have a specific intention or authori-
zation to make a warranty or because any statement relevant to authorship is,
or purports to be, or is capable of being merely the art merchant's opinion.
MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 442.322(2)(a). Section 442.321(1)(a) specifically defines a public
auctioneer as an art merchant. Id. § 442.321(1)(a).
86. Id. § 442.321(1)(f). This section defines "written instrument" as
a written or printed agreement, bill of sale, or any other written or printed
note or memorandum of the sale or exchange of a work of fine art by an art
merchant and includes a written or printed catalog or other prospectus of a
forthcoming sale as well as any written or printed corrections or amendments
thereof.
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sumes no risk, liability or responsibility for the material facts
stated. 8 7 Furthermore, the disclaimer is ineffective if the art work
turns out to be a counterfeit or the information given "is proved to
be, as of the date of sale or exchange, false, mistaken or errone-
ous." ' The auction houses are able to circumvent this to some ex-
tent, however, by qualifying the attribution to artist or date by a
complex system of terminology that limits their liability in case of
misattribution89 One may question the extent to which these
terms would be understood by the prospective purchaser. It is
87. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 13.01(4)(b)(i).
88. Id. § 13.01(4). This section of the New York statute provides in part:
(a) An express warranty and disclaimers intended to negate or limit such war-
ranty shall be construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each other but
subject to the provisions of section 2-202 of the uniform commercial code on
parol or extrinsic evidence, negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent
that such construction is unreasonable.
(b) Such negation or limitation shall be deemed unreasonable if:
(i) the disclaimer is not conspicuous, written and apart from the warranty, in
words which clearly and specifically apprise the buyer that the seller assumes
no risk, liability or responsibility for the material facts stated concerning such
work of fine art. Words of general disclaimer are not sufficient to negate or
limit an express warranty; or
(ii) the work of fine art is proved to be a counterfeit and this was not clearly
indicated in the description of the work; or
(iii) the information provided is proved to be, as of the date of sale or ex-
change, false, mistaken or erroneous.
Id. It is interesting to note that the second provision of subsection 4(b) imposes a continu-
ing strict liability on the art merchant because liability is not qualified by when the art work
is discovered to be a "counterfeit." In the case of a misattribution, however, the art
merchant is liable only if the information was known to be incorrect as of the date of sale.
Apparently no liability attaches if this is established later. Section 442.323 of the Michigan
statute is virtually identical to the quoted portion of the New York statute.
89. Section 13.01(2) of the New York law requires that in construing the warranty, "due
regard shall be given the terminology used and the meaning accorded such terminology by
the customs and usage of the trade at the time and in the locality where the sale or ex-
change took place." N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 13.01(2). Section 13.01(3) further defines
this terminology by specifying that
(a) The work is by a named author or has a named authorship, without any
limiting words, means unequivocally, that the work is by such named author or
has such named authorship;
(b) The work is "attributed to a named author" means a work of the period of
the author, attributed to him, but not with certainty by him; or
(c) The work is of the "school of a named author" means a work of the period
of the author, by a pupil or close follower of the author, but not by the author.
Id. § 13.01(3). The Michigan statute contains virtually the same provision in § 442.322
(2)(b).
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most likely that the sophisticated buyer, who least needs protec-
tion, will benefit the most from these distinctions, whereas the un-
sophisticated, unless an avid reader of the information at the front
of the catalog, will be less likely to benefit.s0 Although the appar-
ent intent of this legislation was to clarify the application of the
U.C.C. warranty provisions to sales of art works and make such
application more effective in protecting the consumer,91 some com-
mentators have argued that this legislation is duplicative of the
A Sotheby Parke-Bernet catalog of the early 1970s, which predated the latest version of
this statute, stated under "Glossary" that "all statements in this catalogue as to authorship,
period, culture, source or origin are qualified statements and are made subject to the provi-
sions of the conditions of sale ... ." There follows a list of terms used in the catalog with
their explanations. For example: author's name followed by "ascribed to the named artist"
indicates the highest category of authenticity but is not an unqualified statement as to au-
thorship; "attributed to . . ." indicates an attribution on the basis of style but with less
certainty than the preceding; "circle of .. ." indicates work by an unknown hand closely
associated with the named artist; "studio of. . ." indicates a work by an unknown hand
executed in the style of the artist under his direct supervision; "school of. . ." indicates a
work by a pupil or close follower of the artist; "manner of. . ." indicates a work in the style
of the artist and probably later; "after. . ." indicates a copy of a known work of the artist.
PARKE-BERNET, GALLERIES, OLD MASTER AND ENGLISH PAINTINGS (New York Galleries 1971).
90. Section 13.03 of the New York statute provides that the intentional issuance of a false
certificate of authenticity is a class A misdemeanor. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 13.03.
The statute also provides additional, special protections for purchasers of visual art objects
produced in multiples. Section 13.05 makes the express warranty provisions of section 13.01
available to the buyer of multiples who is also an art merchant (who is otherwise excluded
from protection under this section). Id. § 13.05. Furthermore, article 15 places an affirmative
obligation on the art merchant who sells a visual art object produced in multiples to disclose
certain information about the object. Id. §§ 15.01-.19. The information required varies with
the date of the object being sold. Hobart, supra note 58, at 262-64. California, Illinois, Ma-
ryland, and Hawaii also have enacted special legislation to protect purchasers of fine art
multiples, presumably because this area seems to be particularly susceptible to flagrant
abuses. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1740-1745.5 (West 1985); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121-1/2, §§ 361-69
(Smith-Hurd 1987); Hobart, supra note 58, at 265-70; Comment, Art Forgery, supra note 9,
at 350. Attempts to enact broader art legislation in these and other states have been unsuc-
cessful, presumably because the legislators believed that the U.C.C. provided adequate pro-
tection. Du Boff, supra note 9, at 1012.
91. See Du Boff, supra note 9, at 1010-11 (New York statute provides greater protection
to consumer than U.C.C. does, particularly by limiting art merchant's ability to disclaim
express warranty); Comment, Art Forgery, supra note 9, at 339-41, 342-51 (statute's war-
ranty provision shifts burden of proving authenticity from buyer to seller and eliminates
uncertainty created by U.C.C.); Comment, U.C.C. Warranty Provisions, supra note 9, at
555-56 (New York statute helps consumer but does not go far enough); Comment, Current
Practices, supra note 9, at 558-63 (despite drawbacks, New York statute offers consumers
the best protection particularly by shifting responsibility of proving authenticity to seller
and eliminating uncertainty).
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U.C.C. provisions or, even worse, detrimental to the proper func-
tioning of the art market.2
This specialized New York legislation has been used only once to
define more precisely the application of the U.C.C. to the problems
raised by dealing in art objects. In Dawson v. G. Malina, Inc., 3 the
plaintiff had purchased eleven Chinese ceramics and jade sculp-
tures from the defendant. After consulting with several experts
who expressed doubts concerning the authenticity of one of the
pieces, Dawson attempted to rescind the purchases. 4 GMI, the de-
fendant, agreed to the return of several of the objects, but the dis-
position of five remained in dispute. The central issue in the case
was whether the defendant-had breached a warranty in connection
with the sale of these five disputed items.9 Dawson argued that
GMI had expressly warranted that the objects were in conformity
with the descriptions provided in letters, invoices, and the final bill
of sale sent by GMI.96 Dawson relied on section 219-c of the New
York General Business Law, which incorporated any benefit that
might be derived from section 2-313 of the New York Commercial
Code. The court interpreted this statute as intending to eliminate
any uncertainty as to whether an art dealer's representations con-
cerning authorship constituted an affirmation of fact, so as to cre-
ate an express warranty under the U.C.C., or merely an expression
of opinion. 97 In fact, the New York statute was so clear that the
defendant conceded that the descriptions of the objects consti-
92. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 82, at 953-62 (protection afforded consumer under
New York statute is similar to that provided by U.C.C. although the former makes it easier
for an art merchant to disclaim an express warranty).
93. 463 F. Supp. 461, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 465.
96. Id. at 466.
97. Id. at 465 n.3. At the time of the Dawson decision, § 219-c of the General Business
Law, which was later replaced by § 13.01 of the Arts and Cultural Affairs Law, stated:
Any provision in any other law to the contrary notwithstanding: 1. Whenever
an art merchant, in selling or exchanging a work of fine art, furnishes to a
buyer of such work who is not an art merchant, a written instrument which, in
describing the work, identifies it with any author or authorship, such descrip-
tion (i) shall be presumed to be part of the basis of the bargain and (ii) shall
create an express warranty of the authenticity of such authorship as of the
date of such sale or exchange. Such warranty shall not be negated or limited
because the seller in the written instrument did not use formal words such as
"warrant" or "guarantee" or because he did not have a specific intention or
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tuted express warranties, and the only issue litigated was whether
the descriptions given were significantly incorrect, so as to consti-
tute a breach of the express warranties."
In order to determine whether the warranties had been
breached, the court had to decide the appropriate standard of
proof and determine which party should bear the burden of
proof.99 Dawson argued that he should have to show only that the
works of art failed in any respect to conform to the descriptions
given, whereas the defendant maintained that the applicable stan-
dard should take into account the inherent inexactness of any at-
tribution of a work of art. e00 The court determined that the plain-
tiff had the burden of proof and that the appropriate standard
would be based on whether the representations "can be said to
have had a reasonable basis in fact, at the time that these repre-
sentations were made, with the question of whether there was such
a reasonable basis in fact being measured by the expert testimony
provided at trial."''1 Using the testimony of expert witnesses
presented by both parties, the court concluded that three of the
five warranties given for the disputed objects did not have a rea-
sonable basis in fact and that the defendant had thereby breached
these warranties.0 2
The Michigan Fine Arts statute, which is virtually the same as
the New York Arts statute, was used similarly in Lawson v.
London Arts Group.' s0 In Lawson, the plaintiff had purchased for
$29,000 a pastel that the dealer certified was an original work of
authorization to make a warranty or because any statement relevant to author-
ship is, or purports to be, or is capable of being merely the seller's opinion.
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW, § 219-c (McKinney Supp. 1977), quoted in Dawson, 463 F. Supp. at
465-66.
98. Dawson, 463 F. Supp. at 466.
99. Id. at 466-67.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 467.
102. Id. at 467-71. The defendant had provided unequivocal attributions of the five Chi-
nese pieces to specific dynasties and dates. In the cases of the three warranties that the
court concluded had been breached, expert witnesses for both plaintiff and defendant stated
that the pieces might belong to the attributed time periods but more probably belonged in
different dynasties or periods. The court weighed the relative credibility and degree of cer-
tainty of the different experts' opinions in determining whether the plaintiff had met his
burden of establishing a breach by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.
103. 708 F.2d 226 (6th Cir. 1983).
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Frederick Remington. Several years after the sale, the buyer began
to doubt the work's authenticity and brought suit after her suspi-
cions were confirmed by an expert. At the time of trial, an original
Remington was considered to be worth between $150,000 and
$175,000.104 Three issues were decided by the court on appeal.
First, it determined that the dealer's written statement that "this
is to certify that An Indian Brave by Frederick Remington Draw-
ing done in 1901 . . . is an original work as described" constituted
an express warranty in accordance with statutory provision." 5 Sec-
ond, the court affirmed the jury's finding that the warranty had
been made in bad faith because the dealer knew or should have
known that the pastel was a copy and had made no effort to au-
thenticate it. 106 Because the warranty was made in bad faith, the
plaintiff was entitled to full appreciation damages, which in this
case the jury found to be $140,000.107
The third and most complicated issue was which statute of limi-
tations to apply. The court characterized the dealer's warranty as
one of quality or fitness and so applied the discovery rule to the
four-year limitation period. The limitation period therefore did not
commence until the plaintiff began to doubt the work's authentic-
ity.108 The measure of damages awarded and the application of the
discovery rule provide significant additional protection for the pur-
chaser of art works and vary significantly from accepted practices
of dealers and auction houses in the absence of statutory regula-
tion. The Dawson and Lawson cases demonstrate that although
the U.C.C. by itself may not deal adequately with the problems
presented in the art market, in combination with specialized legis-
lation targeted for the art market, such as that existing in New
104. Id. at 227.
105. Id. The court relied on § 442.322(2)(a) of Michigan's Warranty in Fine Arts Statute.
MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 442.322(a)(2) (West Supp. 1987), discussed supra notes 85-86 and
accompanying text.
106. 708 F.2d at 227-28.
107. Id. at 228. The written warranty given to the plaintiff limited her damages to return
of the purchase price if the work was not an original. Id. at 227. Section 442.324(3) of the
Michigan statute provides that an art merchant who makes a warranty in good faith is liable
only for return of the purchase price. MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 442.324(3). However, §
442.324(1) states that this act is to be considered supplementary to, rather than exclusive of,
any other rights or liabilities provided by law. Id. § 442.324(1).
108. 708 F.2d at 228-29 (citing MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 600.5833).
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York and Michigan, the Code may make a considerable contribu-
tion to clarifying the duties of the auctioneer or dealer to a pur-
chaser, particularly in the area of warranties and misrepre-
sentation.
In conclusion, adoption of the U.C.C. alone may do little to pro-
vide increased protection for the consumer over what the common
law affords. Such protection is dependent on the distinction be-
tween the making of an opinion and the making of an express war-
ranty. Sellers of art works generally have succeeded in claiming
that their statements concerning authenticity and authorship con-
stituted mere representations rather than warranties. 109 Although
the Code has been adopted in virtually every state, its failure to go
beyond the common law in this particular area once again raises
the question of the need for additional consumer protection
through either statutory or decisional law.
B. Warranties of Title
U.C.C. section 2-312 provides that in every contract for the sale
of goods, the seller warrants that the title is good and the transfer
rightful.110 Under certain circumstances, however, it is assumed
that the buyer realizes the seller is not claiming to convey good
title or is claiming to convey only such title as a third person may
109. One may agree with another commentator's statement that by a more realistic view,
"the Code, which purports to deal with all forms of personal property, does not always draw
appropriate distinctions which are required to be made where a work of fine art or other
unique article is involved." F. FELDMAN & S. Waim, ART WoRKS, supra note 50, at 287-88; see
also Feldman, New Protection for the Art Collector- Warranties, Opinions and Disclaim-
ers, 23 REc. A.B. CrrY N.Y. 661 (Dec. 1968); Hodes, Wanted: Art Legislation for Illinois, 57
ILL. B.J. 218 (1968).
110. U.C.C. § 2-312 provides:
(1) Subject to subsection (2) there is in a contract for sale a warranty by the
seller that
(a) the title conveyed shall be good, and its transfer rightful; and
(b) the goods shall be delivered free from any security interest or other lien
or encumbrance of which the buyer at the time of contracting has no
knowledge.
(2) A warranty under subsection (1) will be excluded or modified only by spe-
cific language or by circumstances which give the buyer reason to know that
the person selling does not claim title in himself or that he is purporting to sell
only such right or title as he or a third person may have.
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have.'11 As an example, an auction house does not generally have
or claim to have title to the items it offers at auction. 112 A dealer,
on the other hand, generally purchases the art work from the origi-
nal owner or artist, and in such situations the warranty of title
should be assumed to apply."' When a buyer purchases from an
auction house, however, there may be a question whether the auc-
tion house has made such a warranty, although the owner or con-
signor undoubtedly has, and thus whether the auction house has
any liability if the owner, who may be unavailable for suit, ulti-
mately cannot convey good title. In addition, whether a dealer or
auction house is involved, a question may arise as to whether the
warranty has been breached and, if so, what the appropriate mea-
sure of damages should be.
The case of Menzel v. List"14 illustrates the issues raised when
an auction house or dealer conveys a work of art without also con-
veying good title. In 1932, the Menzels purchased a Chagall paint-
ing in Belgium for the equivalent of $150. When the Germans in-
vaded Belgium during World War II, the Menzels left. When they
returned to their apartment after the war, they discovered that the
painting had been taken and a receipt left in its place by the Ger-
111. Id. § 2-312(2) & comment 5 (1978).
112. Id. Comment 5 mentions sales by sheriffs, executors, foreclosing lienors, and persons
"similarly situated" but does not specify auction houses. Nonetheless, at least those pur-
chasers familiar with auction house practices should be assumed to realize that the auction
house does not own the items it auctions. For a discussion of the distinctions in the ways
that auction houses and dealers operate, see infra notes 265-69 and accompanying text. The
1987 New York regulations of auctioneers prohibit an auction house from disclaiming the
warranty of title and require reimbursement of the purchaser if the title to the auctioned
item later proves not to have been transferable. CITY OF NEw YORK ADMIN. CODE § IV, 1 24
(1987).
113. For example, a current case involves the sale of an El Greco painting reportedly for
$2 million by a New York dealer, Wildenstein, to a Dutch dealer who intended to resell the
painting to a Japanese art gallery. Wildenstein did not inform the Dutch dealer that the
painting was subject to claims by the Romanian government, which asserted that it, and not
the Romanian royal family that had sold the painting to Wildenstein, was the true owner.
Although the Romanian government's claim was rejected in a suit brought against Wilden-
stein, the Dutch dealer alleges that it has been unable to resell the painting to the Japanese
art gallery because of the cloud on its title. The Dutch dealer has now sued Wildenstein for
$30 million, alleging misrepresentation, breach of warranty of title, breach of contract, dam-
age to its reputation, and interference with business relations. Van Rijn v. Wildenstein &
Co., 1987 U.S. Dist. lexis 3955, No. 85-3597 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 1987) (denying motions in
limine); Burnham, supra note 5, at 28, col. 4.
114. 24 N.Y.2d 91, 246 N.E.2d 742, 298 N.Y.S.2d 979 (1969).
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man authorities. In 1955, the owners of a New York art gallery
purchased the painting in Paris for $2800 and resold it to Albert
List for $4000. In 1962, Mrs. Menzel recognized the painting in an
art book that identified List as the owner.1 ' She then brought suit
against List to recover the painting,"'6 and he in turn impleaded
the New York art gallery for breach of an implied warranty of title
and asked for the painting's fair market value of $22,500.111
The court, after returning the painting to Mrs. Menzel, held that
List was entitled to the benefit of his bargain, the fair market
value of the painting at the time of its return to Menzel, rather
than simply rescission, which would have given List only the
purchase price plus interest."' The court thus placed the full bur-
den of investigation as to the state of title on the seller, even
though in this case the sellers argued that this would expose them
to "potentially ruinous liability" and that their own seller was es-
sentially judgment proof. '19 Finally, the court indicated that the
115. Id. at 93-94, 246 N.E.2d at 742-43, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 980.
116. See infra notes 186-89 and accompanying text for a discussion of Mrs. Menzel's
claim against List for return of the painting and the application of the statute of limitations.
117. 24 N.Y.2d at 94, 246 N.E.2d at 743, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 980.
118. Id. at 97-98, 246 N.E.2d at 745, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 983.
119. See id. at 98, 246 N.E.2d at 745, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 983. The imposition of absolute
liability for breach of a warranty of good title has interesting implications for the sale of
antiquities with questionable title. Under this theory, a purchaser who had to return an
antiquity to its country of origin might be able to obtain not only rescission of the sale but
also "benefit of the bargain" damages if the value of the object has appreciated in the
interim.
The modern antiquities laws of many Mediterranean, Middle Eastern, and Central and
South American countries make all antiquities the property of the country in which the
object is found. Bator, Essay on the International Trade in Art, 34 STAN. L. REv. 275, 286-
87 (1982). Therefore, any archaeological object that left the country after the date of enact-
ment of the law is "stolen property" unless taken with specific government permission. 1 J.
MERRYMAN & A. ELSEN, supra note 6, at 115, 120-21. In addition, some countries have pro-
hibited the export of objects of archaeological or historical value, even though the exporter
may have good title to the item. Id. at 115; Bator, supra, at 287. Thus, although such an
object may enter the United States legally, the purchaser's title to the object may be in
doubt, and the country of origin could perhaps argue successfully for its return. This point,
however, rarely has been litigated in U.S. courts. See, e.g., Jeanneret v. Vichey, 693 F.2d
259, 267 (2d Cir. 1982) (illegal exportation of art works from country of origin not equated
with failure of good title); United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 1001-02 (5th Cir. 1977)
(National Stolen Property Act applies to objects taken wrongfully from proper owner al-
though not to objects illegally exported from country of origin); United States v. Hol-
linshead, 495 F.2d 1154, 1155-56 (9th Cir. 1974) (affirming conviction of defendants for
transporting art works stolen from Guatemala); Winkworth v. Christie, Manson & Woods,
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buyer has a choice of remedies: rescission when the value of the
piece has depreciated or damages to compensate for the lost expec-
tation interest in case of appreciation. 120
Another dispute, Abrams v. Sotheby Parke-Bernet, Inc.,121 dis-
cussed the extent of the auctioneer's responsibility to investigate
the state of the title of items offered for sale at auction. This suit
involved the auction of a collection of 59 Hebrew books and manu-
scripts dating from the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. These
items originally had belonged to the library of the Hochschule fUr
die Wissenschaft des Judenthums, an institution of Jewish learn-
ing located in what is now East Berlin which had been closed by
the Nazi government in 1942. Sotheby's offered the collection for
auction in the spring of 1984 on consignment from a private indi-
vidual. Sotheby's claimed to have undertaken an extensive investi-
gation into the state of the title and was satisfied that title was
properly in the consignor. 122
The suit was based partially on various asserted misrepresenta-
tions in the catalog that Sotheby's had prepared in conjunction
with the sale, including the statement that the offerings were com-
prised of "selected property from various American and Continen-
tal collections."'123 The primary contention, however, was that the
consignor could not convey proper title to the collection and that
Ltd., 1 All E.R. 1121, 1135-36 (1979) (purchaser in Italy of art works stolen in England
acquired good title even when art works were returned to England, as long as Italian law
recognized purchaser as having good title). See also Bator, supra, at 287 (U.S. law does not
equate illegal export of an object with failure of title); Comment, Title Disputes in the Art
Market: An Emerging Duty of Care for Art Merchants, 51 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 443, 443 &
n.4 (1983) [hereinafter Comment, Title Disputes] (U.S. policy has generally been to refuse
to enforce foreign restrictions on export of art and archaeological objects); Comment, Title
to Illegally Exported Items of Historic or Artistic Worth, 33 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 203, 206-07
(1984) (discussing the lex situs rule applied in the Winkworth decision). Under the reason-
ing of Menzel v. List, the dealer could be held liable to the purchaser for the value of such
works with invalid title if the country of origin succeeded in obtaining the return of the
object. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
120. 24 N.Y.2d at 99, 246 N.E.2d at 745, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 984.
121. No. 42255-84, slip op. at 1-2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 24, 1984) (granting motion for pre-
liminary injunction).
122. Id.
123. Id., slip op. at 3.
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Sotheby's thus had failed to disclose adequately the questionable
state of the title to prospective purchasers.124
Although this suit was expected to establish the requisite stan-
dards for an auction house's research into the quality of title of a
prospective consignor, it never came to trial and was settled with-
out any finding of fault or liability. 125 Sotheby's, however, claimed
to have undertaken an extensive study of the collection's back-
ground and the propriety of the sale. Routine procedure appar-
ently involved checks with the FBI, study of stolen property lists
124. Id., slip op. at 1-5. At the time the suit was initiated, the state Attorney General and
other interested parties thought that the consignor was a former Nazi who presumably had
appropriated the books and manuscripts after the closing of the Hochschule. The consignor,
however, turned out to be the wife of a Professor of Talmudic Studies at Hebrew Union
College who also had been on the faculty of the Hochschule. Professor Guttmann claimed
that he had been given the books and manuscripts by the Chairman of the Board of the
Hochschule, Dr. Heinrich Veit Simon, in exchange for successfully smuggling the books to
safety from Nazi Germany in 1938. Questions were raised as to whether Dr. Veit Simon had
in fact given (as opposed to entrusted) the books to Professor Guttmann and whether Dr.
Veit Simon had the authority, pursuant to the Hochschule's internal regulations, to transfer
title without the consent of the remaining members of the Board of Directors. Although
these questions were never resolved, due to the settlement of the case, a temporary re-
straining order was granted after the sale to prevent the distribution of the auctioned items
and the disbursement of the funds realized by the sale. In granting the order, the judge
stated that given Dr. Guttmann's silence and secrecy for over forty years, his "actions [were]
not consistent with a firmly held belief in his rightful title" and that the Attorney General
had made a preliminary showing of likelihood of success on the merits. Id., slip op. at 8-9.
See Bleich, The Controversy Concerning the Sotheby Sale, 8 CARDOZO L. REv. 91, 91-97
(1986); Comment, Why Is This Sale Different from All Other Sales? Abrams v. Sotheby
Park-Bernet, Inc., 4 CARnozo ARTS & ENr. L.J. 139 (1985).
125. Stipulation and Order of Settlement, Abrams v. Sotheby Parke-Bernet, Inc., No.
42255-84 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 16, 1985), slip op. at 1-2. The settlement agreement provided
that any books and manuscripts sold at the Sotheby's auction to private individuals would
be returned to Sotheby's and then redistributed to public institutions specializing in higher
Jewish learning or with Judaica library collections. Those individuals would receive a refund
of the purchase price of these items. A particularly old Bible and Machzor sold to the Jew-
ish Theological Seminary were to be exhibited for several months at particular institutions
in the United States and then sold, respectively, to Yeshiva University and the Jewish Na-
tional University Library. These two institutions purchased the Bible and the Machzor for
$900,000, which came from an anonymous donation made specifically for this purpose. The
Jewish Theological Seminary was refunded the purchase price for these two items. Professor
Guttmann was to receive $900,000, and Sotheby's seems to have given up most or all com-
missions earned in connection with the auction. Id., slip op. at 2-11.
Another controversy, involving Sotheby's and the Deshong Muscum, also concerned the
consignment of stolen art works. Because this case was also settled out of court, it does not
elucidate the standard of care an auction house should utilize in accepting items on consign-
ment. 2 F. FELDMAN & S. WEL, ART LAW, supra note 50, at 258-59.
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and bills of sale, and public knowledge about the history of an ob-
ject. In the case of the Guttmann collection, Sotheby's also had
studied the history of the sale of Jewish books and manuscripts in
private sales and public auctions and had consulted with Jewish
scholars, librarians, and book dealers. Legal research was under-
taken by both Sotheby's in-house counsel and a German law firm
to investigate German and postwar restitution law."'6 Whether
such an apparently extensive investigation would have proven suf-
ficient to establish that Sotheby's had fulfilled its obligations to
prospective purchasers remains unanswered.
In attempting to establish whether a prospective consignor of
items to be offered for sale has the requisite quality of title, cus-
tomary auction house practice apparently relies primarily on a con-
tract, signed by the owner, stating that the owner has the right to
consign the property and that title and right to possession will pass
to the purchaser free of all liens.121 Auction houses also rely on the
considerable publicity that accompanies the auctioning of major
works of art to prevent the attempted disposition of stolen prop-
erty through public auction. In addition, auction houses occasion-
ally will research the pedigree of items offered for sale when the
circumstances warrant, as demonstrated in the Abrams case.
The more difficult question is the determination of what hap-
pens upon the discovery, after the sale of an object, that the object
was stolen property. Customary practice, according to the presi-
126. McGill, How Sotheby's Research Rare Hebrew Books and Papers for Auction, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 30, 1984, at C17, col. 1 (late ed.). Although Sotheby's research did appear to be
extensive, the Attorney General and other interested parties pointed to several factors that
should have made Sotheby's suspicious, including the lack of any documentation to support
Guttmann's claims, the bylaws of the Hochschule, which would have prevented such a
transfer, and the secrecy with which Guttmann dealt with the materials for over forty years.
The auction house of Christie's apparently was also contacted concerning the collection, but
it had not initiated any investigation at the time that Sotheby's acquired the books and
manuscripts. Id.
127. The following discussion of auction house practices regarding title of objects offered
for sale is based on interviews with officials at New York's four largest art auction houses
(Sotheby's, Christie's, Phillips Son & Neale, and William Doyle Galleries), as reported in
Reif, Auctions-The Silent Role of Consignors, N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1985, at C23, col. 1 (late
ed.).
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dent of Christie's, is to refund the entire purchase price to the
buyer and return the object to the rightful owner.128
Although this may appear to be a relatively generous practice on
the part of auction houses, it does not seem to comport with the
law, at least as enunciated in the Menzel decision. 129 According to
that case, the disappointed buyer is entitled to the expectation in-
terest and not merely rescission of the sale, which is what the vol-
untary practice appears to afford. The auction house therefore
must not only refund the purchase price but also give the buyer
the fair market value of the item at the time it is returned to its
rightful owner.130 An additional distinction must be made, how-
ever. Menzel involved not an auction house but an art gallery or
dealer, and as will be discussed later, different standards of duties
and liabilities may apply to each.131 Because the Abrams case was
never decided on its merits, apparently no reported decisions de-
termine the appropriate remedy to be afforded the auction pur-
chaser of stolen items.
C. Auction House Practices and Self-Regulation
Several practices commonly followed by auction houses re-
present attempts by the industry to respond to legal criticism and
court decisions and to accommodate changes in the art market as
well. One of the more controversial practices is the use of the "re-
serve" system of bidding. Under this system, the consignor (usually
the owner or an agent) and the auction house agree on a secret
price beneath which only the consignor may purchase the art work.
If this price is not met in the bidding, then the consignor "buys in"
the work and; in addition, pays a commission of approximately five
percent, which is less than the commission paid for an actual
sale. 3 2 This system can become very complicated if several items
are consigned with a combined reserve or floating reserve, so that
128. Id. The refund to the buyer is made even if the auction house has turned over the
proceeds to the consignor and the consignor is unavailable for suit.
129. 24 N.Y. 2d 91, 98, 246 N.E.2d 742, 745-46, 298 N.Y.S.2d 979, 984 (1969).
130. Id. at 97, 246 N.E.2d at 745, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 983. See supra notes 118-20 and accom-
panying text.
131. See infra notes 265-69 and accompanying text.
132. 2 F. FELDMAN & S. WEn., ART LAW, supra note 50, at 192; F. FELDmAN & S. WElL, ART
WORKS, supra note 50, at 356; 2 J. MERRYMAN & A. ELSEN, supra note 6, at 505-07.
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the reserve price can fluctuate during the progress of the sale. 13 3
Finally, the auction house, in publishing the sale prices of art
works, may list a repurchase by the owner at the reserve price in
the same way as a sale to a third party. As a result, the owner
could set a high reserve price, and, even if the object did not sell at
this high price, the work would receive a market valuation
equivalent to the reserve because the object was assumed to have
actually sold at that price. The owner thus would be able to inflate
the value of that work as well as that of other works by the same
artist. 34
In response to criticism, Sotheby's changed this practice in the
early 1970s. The "Conditions of Sale" listed in the front of the auc-
tion catalog now states that a reserve system may be in effect and
that the catalog includes an estimated value that is above the re-
serve price.3 5 In this way, a potential buyer would have at least
some idea of the reserve price and, at the auction, would have
some indication whether the bidding was against a third party
buyer or against the auctioneer "bidding" on behalf of the owner.
In addition, a "buy in" by the consignor is no longer listed in the
post-auction catalog as a sale.
In 1972, Sotheby's also instituted a policy of guaranteed prices.
Under this policy, the auction house guarantees the owner a cer-
tain price, and if this price is not met, will itself purchase the item.
Such a guarantee is subject to payment of an increased commis-
sion.'36 Although this practice is not in itself objectionable, it can
be used in combination with the reserve system to make the auc-
tion house both the seller and the buyer of the object, setting up
what is essentially a "mock auction." Such a system, using third-
party bidders to legitimize what could be viewed as an attempt to
create inflated values, may be unethical or even illegal. 37
133. 2 F. FELDMAN & S. WEIL, ART LAW, supra note 50, at 184-86; F. FELDMAN & S. WEIL,
ART WORKS, supra note 50, at 356.
134. See 2 F. FELDMAN & S. WEIL, ART LAW, supra note 50, at 184-86, 191-92; 2 J. MER-
RYMAN & A. ELSEN, supra note 6, at 504-07.
135. See, e.g., SOTHEBY PARKE-BERNET, FINE JUDAICA. PRINTED BOOKS, MANUSCRIPTS AND
WORKS OF ART (New York Galleries, Nov. 24, 1982) [hereinafter SOTHEBY'S, FINE JUDAICA].
136. 2 F. FELDMAN & S. WEIL, ART LAW, supra note 50, at 192.
137. Feldman and Weil suggest that such a "mock auction" would constitute a misde-
meanor under New York law. 2 F. FELDMAN & S. WEIL, ART LAW, supra note 50, at 192. The
1987 New York regulations prohibit the practice of guaranteed minimums unless its use is
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Another major change in auction house practices occurred in re-
action to the lower court decision in Weisz, even though that deci-
sion ultimately was reversed.l3 In 1973, Sotheby's announced that
it would guarantee the authorship of all post-1870 works and the
authenticity of pre-1870 works.139 Several limits were put on this
guarantee, however. First, it extends only to the heading in bold
type listed in the catalog according to the technical terminology
system of attribution established by the auction house.14 ° Second,
the guarantee is valid for only five years from the date of sale, re-
gardless of when the discovery of lack of authenticity is made.' In
contrast, the court in Weisz applied the statute of limitations from
the time of discovery, not the time of sale.'42
A purchaser probably will not undertake the kinds of sophisti-
cated and expensive scientific testing required to determine the au-
disclosed in the catalog. CITY OF NEW YORK ADMIN. CODE § II, 11. Sotheby's catalog now
specifies which objects are "owned property," defined as "property which ... is owned
solely or partially by us or an affiliate (and in the sale of which we are acting as a principal
and not an agent)." The auctioneer may make bids to protect the reserve placed on the item
by Sotheby's as owner. This practice is comparable to the bids which the auctioneer may
make to protect the reserve placed on an item when it is consigned by an outside seller.
SOTHEBY'S, FiNE JUDAICA, supra note 135.
138. Weisz v. Parke-Bernet Galleries, 67 Misc. 2d 1077, 325 N.Y.S.2d 576 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.
1971), reo'd, 77 Misc. 2d 80, 351 N.Y.S.2d 911 (N.Y. App. Term 1974).
139. 2 F. FELDMAN & S. WE., ART LAw, supra note 50, at 195-97.
140. SOTHEBY'S, FINE JUDAICA, supra note 135. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
141. SOTHEBY'S, FINE JUDAICA, supra note 135.
142. See Weisz, 67 Misc. 2d at 1083, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 582-83. In commenting on a 10-day
limit imposed by the catalog's conditions of sale, the court in Weisz stated:
The rule was well established under the former Sales Act (and continues to be
followed under the Uniform Commercial Code) that a limitation which applied
to a claim that could not realistically be known before the end of the limitation
was unreasonable and invalid .... The instant facts-where a buyer justifia-
bly relied on a representation that a named artist created a work of art, was
intended to rely on it, and no reason was presented for questioning the accu-
racy of the representation during the 10-day period-clearly come within that
rule.
Id., 325 N.Y.S.2d at 582. The court applied the same reasoning to hold that the statute of
limitations did not bar the action. Id. at 1083, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 583.
Regardless of whether the discovery rule should always be applied in such suits to modify
the relevant statute of limitations, the auction house should not have the unilateral right to
exact a waiver of legal rights from a prospective purchaser unless the waiver has been specif-
ically and freely negotiated between the parties. For a fuller discussion of applicable stat-
utes of limitation in the context of recovery of stolen art works, see infra notes 186-220 and
accompanying text.
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thenticity of a work, especially, for example, of an older archaeo-
logical object. The fortuitous decision of an expert to study a
certain category of objects therefore is often the catalyst that leads
to a discovery of lack of authenticity. Because a purchaser cannot
reasonably investigate a work's authenticity, the court's decision in
Weisz to start the statute of limitations at the time of discovery
seems correct in this context. 1 3 Sotheby's guarantee thus attempts
to limit considerably the legal recourse otherwise available to the
purchaser. Furthermore, this guarantee is not assignable to subse-
quent purchasers, 44 which further restricts the relief that should
be available.
Third, the guarantee states that rescission of the sale and return
of the purchase price are "exclusive and in lieu of any other rem-
edy which might otherwise be available as a matter of law.' 1 45 In
Menzel, which admittedly involved failure of title rather than fail-
ure of authorship, the court awarded the purchaser's expectation
interest-that is, the value of the painting at the time of
trial-rather than simple rescission.146 As in Menzel, the difference
between these two measures of damages can be considerable. Ac-
cording to the implication of the catalog statement, the purchaser,
by participating in the auction, presumably agrees to the terms of
the guarantee and thus forfeits the right to recover the larger
amount of damages. Although this point apparently has not been
litigated, one may question whether the notice printed in the cata-
log is adequate to constitute a waiver of legal rights. At the least, a
court would again need to engage in consideration of questions of
adequacy of notice, as in the Weisz decision.147
Finally, one should note that this guarantee and the other
changes in industry practice are voluntary changes that have been
adopted to varying degrees by the different auction houses. Such
voluntary practices do not afford the prospective purchaser of art
143. 67 Misc. 2d at 1083, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 583.
144. SOTHEBY'S, FINE JUDAICA, supra note 135, Terms of Guarantee, at para. 3.
145. Id. at para. 4.
146. 24 N.Y.2d 91, 97, 246 N.E.2d 742, 744-45, 298 N.Y.S.2d 979, 982-83. See supra notes
118-20 and accompanying text.
147. 67 Misc. 2d at 1080-81, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 580. See supra notes 29-41 and accompany-
ing text.
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works the same extent of protection as statutes and judicial
decisions.
III. DUTIES TO THE OWNER, CONSIGNOR, OR ORIGINAL ARTIST
A. Fraud and Misrepresentation
Although the nature of the duty owed by the seller of art works
to a buyer has not yet been fully developed by existing case law,
the nature of the duty owed to the owner, consignor, or original
artist is much clearer. The relationship between the seller and the
owner is an agency relationship, and the duty thus resembles that
of a fiduciary. This standard is well illustrated by the recent deci-
sion in Cristallina S.A. v. Christie, Manson & Woods Interna-
tional, Inc. 14
This case involved the attempted auction of eight Impressionist
paintings by Christie's on behalf of a consignor, Cristallina, a cor-
poration engaged solely in the purchase and sale of works of art.
According to the complaint, Cristallina, through its representative
Dimitri Jodidio, asked Christie's to arrange an auction of these
paintings. In a series of meetings between February and April
1981, David Bathurst, Christie's president at the time, selected
eight paintings, presented low and high estimates of the amount
Jodidio could expect to realize at an auction, and emphasized the
advantages of a public auction over a private sale. The lowest an-
ticipated private sale figure was $7,850,000; the auction estimates
ranged from $8,500,000 to $12,600,000. Jodidio signed a consign-
ment contract with Christie's, which then proceeded to advertise
the sale and prepare a catalog for the auction. 149 This process also
included setting reserve figures. 150
148. 117 A.D.2d 284, 502 N.Y.S.2d 165 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986).
149. Id. at 286-87, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 167-68.
150. Id. at 287 & n.2, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 168 & n.2. The setting of a reserve figure permits
the owner and his or her agent, the auctioneer, to withdraw an item from auction if the
highest bid is too low. Such withdrawal theoretically is explained by characterizing the bid
as an offer and the hammering down of the item as the acceptance. As a result, there is no
binding contract to sell until the auctioneer signifies acceptance. This reasoning was first set
out by Lord Kenyon in Payne v. Cave, 100 Eng. Rep. 502 (1789), and is generally accepted
in most common law jurisdictions and codified by the Uniform Sales Act, UNIF. SALES ACT §
21(2), reprinted in I. MARIASH, A TREATiSE ON THE LAW OF SALES § 171, at 411-13 (1930),
and the Uniform Commercial Code, U.C.C. § 2-328(2), (3). The theory is apparently re-
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After the paintings arrived in New York but before public an-
nouncement of the auction, Christopher Burge, the head of Chris-
tie's Impressionist painting department, expressed his doubts to
Bathurst concerning the auction appeal of the paintings. These
doubts, however, were not passed on to Jodidio.' 5' In early May,
just a few weeks before the sale, Burge suggested high estimates 52
for the collection which were only slightly above the reserves sug-
gested by Burge in February and approximately $2,000,000 lower
than the high presale estimate figures used by Bathurst in his ini-
tial discussions with Jodidio.'55 According to accepted industry
practice and Christie's own policy as announced in its catalogs, the
reserve, which is kept secret, is not supposed to exceed the high
presale estimate.15 4 Despite this policy, however, the reserves for
several of the paintings equalled or exceeded the published high
estimates.155 In addition, at the last moment before the auction
and without consulting Jodidio, Bathurst decided to add a "float-
ing reserve" to two of the paintings, thus further increasing the
discrepancy. 156
The sale itself was a virtual failure. Only one painting actually
sold-a Degas, which received a record price of $2,200,000. 16 After
the sale, however, Bathurst advised Christie's press office that
jected, however, by many civil law nations. See Hickling, Auctions Without Reserve, 5 U.
BRiT. COLUm. L. REV. 187, 187-191 (1970) (arguing that the common law should also permit
auctions without reserve by characterizing the placing of an item for auction as the offer and
the highest bid as the acceptance that creates a binding sale contract).
151. Cristallina, 117 A.D.2d at 287-88, 50 N.Y.S.2d at 168.
152. High and low estimates are published in the auction catalog to inform prospective
purchasers of the approximate price range within which the auction house expects the final
price to fall. Id. at 288, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 168.
153. Id. at 288 & n.3, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 168-69 & n.3.
154. Id. at 288, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 169.
155. For example, the reserve for one Van Gogh painting, "Houses," initially had been set
at $2,200,000. At Bathurst's recommendation, the reserve was raised in May to $2,300,300,
although the high estimate for the painting was only $2,000,000. According to Burge, other
reserve figures were excessively high and violated the normal practice, as Burge noted, that
"[i]deally, reserves should be around 80 percent of our published estimates." Id. at 289, 502
N.Y.S.2d at 169. In addition, just a few days before the auction, Christie's advised the media
that it expected to realize between $5,000,000 and $9,000,000 for the group of paintings. The
total reserve, however, was set at $9,250,000, which exceeded Christie's publicly announced
expectations. Id. at 289-90, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 169.
156. Id. at 291, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 170.
157. Id.
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three paintings had in fact sold, and this was subsequently con-
firmed by a formal press release approved by both Bathurst and
Burge. 158
Cristallina then initiated a suit against Christie's, alleging fraud-
ulent misrepresentation, negligence, breach of contract, and breach
of fiduciary duty.159 Cristallina's claims were based on Bathurst's
conduct in selecting paintings that would be difficult to sell at auc-
tion, failing to advise Jodidio of questions concerning the appeal of
these paintings, advising the media and the public that the value
of the paintings was lower than that told to Jodidio, and setting
reserves higher than the published high presale estimates.1 0 The
trial court granted summary judgment for Christie's and Bathurst,
but this was reversed on appeal.""'
The appellate division held that an auction house acts as an
agent of the consignor and, as such, Christie's had "a fiduciary
duty to act in the utmost good faith and in the interest of Cristal-
lina, its principal, throughout their relationship." '62 The court
found that because Bathurst had not told Jodidio of Burge's
doubts that the full value of the paintings could be realized
through a public auction, Christie's had failed to inform Cristallina
of vital information that might have led Cristallina to change its
decision concerning the auction and thus preserve the value of the
paintings. 163 In addition, by setting reserves higher than the
presale high estimates in violation of its own policy, Christie's had
made any sale of the paintings at auction virtually impossible.'" In
reinstating the claims for breach of contract, negligence, and
breach of fiduciary duty, the court stated:
While an auctioneer, acting as the agent of an art seller, is not
required to guarantee the results of a sale or, for that matter,
158. Id. The release of this false information led to the temporary suspension of the auc-
tion licenses of both Bathurst (for two years) and Burge (for four months) and the fine
imposed on Christie's. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
159. Cristallina, 117 A.D.2d at 291, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 171.
160. Id. at 291-92, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 171.
161. Id.
162. Id. (citing Elco Shoe Mfg., Inc. v. Sisk, 260 N.Y. 100, 103, 183 N.E. 191, 192 (1932);
In re Premier Container Corp., 95 Misc. 2d 859, 866, 408 N.Y.S.2d 725, 729-30 (1978)).
163. Id. at 292-93, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 171.
164. Id. at 292-93 & n.7, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 171-72 & n.7.
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even predict the price that a particular item will bring, he is
nonetheless held to a standard of care commensurate with the
special skill which is the norm in the locality for that kind of
work."6 5
Christie's argued that Cristallina's claim of misrepresentation
should fail because Bathurst was merely expressing an opinion, not
making a representation as to an existing fact. The latter is action-
able, whereas the former is not. 6' This dichotomy between expres-
sion of opinion and statement of fact raises the same difficulty in
establishing a claim for fraud as was considered in the discussion
of buyers' claims for fraud and misrepresentation. 167 The court,
however, rejected this argument, noting that even if Bathurst had
been presenting only an opinion, he had an obligation to render
such opinion truthfully and that even statements of value could, in
certain circumstances, constitute a representation of existing
fact.16 The court also permitted Cristallina's claim for punitive
damages to stand because it was based on allegations that Chris-
tie's had acted recklessly and in conscious disregard of Cristallina's
rights. 69
In addition to the court's clear definition of the relationship be-
tween an auction house and the seller as that of agent and fiduci-
ary, the court in Cristallina enunciated the standards for deter-
mining the appropriate measure of damages if Cristalina were to
prevail at trial on the merits. 7 0 The court concluded that the mea-
sure of damages should be the difference between the paintings'
pre-auction value and their value after the auction.' 7 ' The court
165. Id. at 293-94, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 172.
166. Id. at 294, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 172.
167. See supra notes 13-26 and accompanying text.
168. Cristallina, 117 A.D.2d at 294, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 172. Such statements are considered
to constitute a statement of material existing fact when the author makes an expression or
prediction about some future event and knows or anticipates at the time the statement is
made that the event will not occur. Id. at 294-95, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 172.
169. Id. at 295, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 173.
170. Id. The case did eventually go to trial, only to be settled out of court after approxi-
mately one week of testimony. Under the settlement, Cristallina dropped its charges against
Christie's in exchange for a cash payment of undisclosed amount. After announcement of
the settlement, Burge stated, "The unpredictability of auctions has been upheld, and the
impossibility of guaranteeing estimates." McGill, An Out-of-Court Settlement Reached in
Christie's Case, N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1987, at C20, col. 1.
171. 117 A.D.2d at 295, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 173.
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looked to Bathurst's initial estimates of the paintings' value and
the value Christie's had placed on them for insurance purposes to
establish pre-auction values. 2 At the time the decision was writ-
ten, four paintings had been sold privately at prices significantly
lower than Bathurst's pre-auction appraisals. The difference in
these values would serve as the basis for determining the damages
to be awarded.17 3
In reaching its conclusion, the court in Cristallina relied in part
on another decision that also raised the issue of the appropriate
measure of damages when the sale of art works involved the breach
of a fiduciary duty. In re Estate of Rothko 7 4 concerned the dispo-
sition of the estate of the abstract expressionist painter Mark
Rothko, which included 798 paintings. The executors of his estate
agreed to sell these paintings to Marlborough Gallery with a fifty-
percent commission, unless the paintings were sold to or through
other dealers, in which case the commission was to be forty per-
cent.'1 5 Several of the contract terms were questionable, including
the inflated commission (paintings sold during Rothko's lifetime
through Marlborough had earned only a ten-percent commission),
interest-free installment payments over a twelve-year period, and
the sale of so many paintings within a short period of time."' Of
the three estate executors, one was a director, secretary, and trea-
surer of Marlborough and another was an aspiring artist who,
within months after the signing of the estate contract, concluded
another contract in which Marlborough agreed to represent him. 77
The court determined that all three executors had violated their
172. Id.
173. Id. For this differential to serve as the basis for the measure of damages, the de-
crease in the value of the paintings that had not been sold at auction must have been attrib-
utable to the failure of the auction. Burge had expressed his opinion that although the
paintings were in fact worth Bathurst's original high estimates, the higher estimates were
not obtainable at a public auction but apparently might have been obtainable through a
private sale. Id. at 292, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 171. Given Bathurst's assertions to Jodidio that an
auction would realize higher prices than a private sale and Jodidio's reliance on Bathurst's
expert advice, this result seems to be appropriate.
174. 43 N.Y.2d 305, 372 N.E.2d 291, 401 N.Y.S.2d 449, aff'g 56 A.D.2d 499, 392 N.Y.S.2d
870 (1977).
175. Id. at 314-15, 372 N.E. 2d at 293, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 451.
176. Id., 372 N.E.2d at 293-94, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 451-52.
177. Id. at 315-16, 372 N.E.2d at 294, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 452.
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duty of loyalty and that two of them had serious conflicts between
their personal interests and those of the estate.17
The type of damages awarded for these breaches of fiduciary
duty accords with that awarded in Cristallina. The New York
Court of Appeals, relying on Menzel v. List,17 9 upheld an award for
what it termed "appreciation" damages.
To make the injured party whole, in both instances the quantum
of damages should be the same. In other words, since the paint-
ings cannot be returned, the estate is therefore entitled to their
value at the time of the decree, i.e., appreciation damages. These
are not punitive damages in a true sense, rather they are dam-
ages intended to make the estate whole .... [T]hese damages
might be considered by some to be exemplary in a sense, in that
they serve as a warning to others, but their true character is as-
certained when viewed in the light of overriding policy consider-
ations and in the realization that the sale and consignment were
not merely sales below value but inherently wrongful transfers
which should allow the owner to be made whole. 80
The holdings in Rothko, Cristallina, and Menzel are all in ac-
cord. When works of art are wrongfully transferred due to theft,
breach of fiduciary duty, or fraudulent misrepresentation, the
wronged party, whether the seller or buyer, is entitled to be made
whole. In Rothko and Menzel, the value of the art works had ap-
preciated between the time of the wrongful conduct and the date
of the court decision. The wronged parties therefore were awarded
appreciation damages; that is, the increase in value during the in-
terim period. 8' The decision in Cristallina demonstrates the ap-
plication of similar principles when the value decreases. Here, the
value of the paintings had decreased between the time of the
178. Id. at 319-20, 372 N.E.2d at 296-97, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 454-55. The case finally ended
with the virtual dissolution of the Rothko Foundation. Following these court decisions, the
foundation recovered and then distributed more than 1000 Rothko paintings to various mu-
seums. The attorney for one of the plaintiffs in the case stated that it "symbolized the
commercialism of art today. It has too much of a dollar sign attached to it." Glueck, Rothko
Art Dispute Ends Quietly After 15 Years, N.Y. Times, Aug. 20, 1986, at C17, col. 1.
179. 24 N.Y.2d 91, 246 N.E.2d 742, 298 N.Y.S.2d 979 (1969).
180. Rothko, 43 N.Y.2d at 322, 372 N.E.2d at 298, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 456 (citations
omitted).
181. Id. at 322-23, 372 N.E.2d at 298-99, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 456-57; Menzel, 24 N.Y.2d at
97-98, 246 N.E.2d at 745, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 982-83.
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wrongful conduct and their ultimate disposition, allegedly due to
the wrongful conduct of the defendant.182 The court therefore
ruled that the defendant could be held liable for "depreciation"
damages; that is, the decrease in value attributable to the defend-
ant's breach of fiduciary duty.183 The fact that the same measure
of damages is applicable, regardless of whether the injured party is
the buyer or the owner of an art work, indicates that a unifying
theory of the duties and liabilities that the art merchant owes to
the buyer and the owner might be devised to ensure adequate pro-
tection for both types of participants in the art market."8
B. Questions of Title.
In the previous section, the question was raised concerning the
obligation of the seller to the buyer when a subsequent discovery
reveals that the former was not able to convey good title to the
latter. This section considers a different type of issue concerning
passing of title-when can the auction house or dealer gain or con-
vey good title to an art work even though the owner (sometimes
the original artist) has not intended to pass title? This issue may
arise in two different contexts-theft or entrustment-with differ-
ing consequences for the ability to convey title. In case of a theft,
the common law rule is that a thief can never pass good title,
whereas in an entrustment situation, under certain circumstances
now generally regulated by the U.C.C., a merchant may be able to
convey good title. However, several recent cases demonstrate that
situations involving both theft and entrustment have now become
intertwined with the law of adverse possession and the policy con-
siderations which it invokes.
1. Theft
As stated above, the general rule under both the common law
and the U.C.C. is that in a case of theft, the thief can never convey
good title to stolen property because the original owner did not
intend to part with the item. This is true even when the thief sells
182. Cristallina, 117 A.D.2d at 295, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 173.
183. Id.
184. See infra notes 279-300 and accompanying text for consideration of such a unifying
theory of the art merchant's duties and liabilities.
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the item to a bona fide purchaser for value who takes without no-
tice of the theft.185
In Menzel v. List, although the defendant was a bona fide pur-
chaser for value, he did not obtain good title to the Chagall paint-
ing he had purchased from a New York art dealer because the
painting had been stolen from the original owner.'86 In the lower
court, List argued that the statute of limitations had run against
the original owner, thereby barring the suit for replevin. The court
rejected this defense, stating:
[W]ith respect to a bona fide purchaser of personal property a
demand by the rightful owner is a substantive, rather than a
procedural, prerequisite to the bringing of an action for conver-
sion by the owner .... If that be so, then the statute of limita-
tions did not begin to run until demand and refusal. 187
Because the plaintiff, Mrs. Menzel, had instituted her suit within
three years of asking List to return the painting to her, her suit
was not barred, even though more than twenty years had passed
since the theft and seven years since List had acquired the paint-
ing. 88 The cause of action did not accrue until the rightful owner
requested the return of the item and the demand was refused.'
This case thus introduced into the law concerning theft of art
works the "demand and refusal" requirement for the beginning of
185. The common law rule has been stated as: "One who purchases stolen property from
a thief, no matter how innocently, acquires no title in the property; title remains in the
owner. This rule places the responsibility of ascertaining true ownership on the purchaser."
Olin Corp. v. Cargo Carriers, Inc., 673 S.W.2d 211, 216 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (citations omit-
ted). This rule is codified in U.C.C. § 2-403(1), which states: "A purchaser of goods acquires
all title which his transferor had or had power to transfer .. " Since a thief has no title,
no title can be conveyed once a theft breaks the chain of conveyance.
186. 49 Misc. 2d 300, 302-03, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804, 807-08 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966), modified and
aff'd, 28 A.D.2d 516, 279 N.Y.S.2d 608 (1967), rev'd on other grounds, 24 N.Y.2d 91, 246
N.E.2d 742, 298 N.Y.S.2d 979 (1969). For the facts of Menzel, see supra text accompanying
notes 114-20.
187. Menzel v. List, 22 A.D.2d 647, 647, 253 N.Y.S. 2d 43, 44 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964) (af-
firming lower court's denial of motion to dismiss).
188. Id.
189. Id. Neither did the Statute of Limitations bar List's third-party complaint against
the New York gallery that sold the painting to him. Stating that List's action was one for
breach of the warranty of "quiet possession," the court held that List's quiet possession had
not been disturbed until Menzel's request for the return of the painting. List thus was enti-
tled to sue the gallery for breach of this warranty. 28 A.D.2d at 516, 279 N.Y.S.2d at 609.
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the running of the statute of limitations or, in other words, for the
accrual of the cause of action.
Although serving to protect the victim of art theft, the "demand
and refusal" rule has met with considerable criticism. This criti-
cism centers on the notion that the genesis of the rule is the pro-
tection of the innocent possessor of stolen property, who is not
considered a converter of property until he or she refuses a de-
mand for its return by its rightful owner.190 The application of the
rule in this type of situation, however, may serve to protect the
knowing wrongdoer, in whose favor the statute of limitations be-
gins to run at the moment the theft occurs. On the other hand, the
rule does not protect the innocent possessor, who may possess the
stolen property for many years before the statute of limitations be-
gins to run because the original owner has not yet demanded re-
turn of the property.19
Another approach to this statute of limitations problem is exem-
plified by O'Keeffe v. Snyder.1 9 2 The artist Georgia O'Keeffe
claimed that three of her paintings were stolen while on display in
the gallery of her husband, Alfred Stieglitz, in 1946."' Nearly
thirty years later, O'Keeffe discovered the paintings in the posses-
sion of a New York art gallery and sued in replevin to recover
them.19 4 Snyder, representing the Princeton Gallery of Fine Art,
which had subsequently purchased the paintings, defended on the
grounds that the six-year statute of limitations barred O'Keeffe's
action.19 5 The trial court granted summary judgment for Snyder,
applying the statute of limitations to bar her suit."'8
190. The bona fide purchaser, who is unaware of the original theft (unlike the thief or one
who takes with notice of the theft), should be given the opportunity to right the wrong
before suit can be brought. Gillet v. Roberts, 57 N.Y. 28, 34 (1874). See Ward, The Georgia
Grind-Can the Common Law Accommodate the Problems of Title in the Art World, Ob-
servations on a Recent Case, 8 J.C. & U.L. 534, 554 (1981-1982).
191. Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150, 1161 (2d Cir. 1982). For
criticism that the demand requirement for accrual of the cause of action is against public
policy because it protects the bad faith-possessor but not the good-faith possessor, see Com-
ment, The Recovery of Stolen Art: Of Paintings, Statues, and Statutes of Limitations, 27
UCLA L. Rav. 1122, 1138-40 (1980).
192. 170 N.J. Super. 75, 405 A.2d 840 (1979), rev'd, 83 N.J. 478, 416 A.2d 862 (1980).
193. O'Keeffe, 83 N.J. at 484, 416 A.2d at 865.
194. Id. at 486, 416 A.2d at 866.
195. Id., 416 A.2d at 864-65.
196. Id., 416 A.2d at 865.
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The Appellate Division reversed, finding that Snyder had failed
to establish all the elements of adverse possession. Without these
elements, his possession could not trigger the running of the stat-
ute of limitations and thus bar O'Keeffe's claim. 197 In particular,
the court held that Snyder's possession and that of his predeces-
sors in title, whose periods of possession were to be tacked so as to
constitute the required number of years, were not sufficiently open
and notorious.' e This element of adverse possession failed primar-
ily because the paintings had almost always been kept in private
homes rather than on public display. 9 The intended purpose of
the elements required to establish adverse possession, particularly
the open and notorious requirement, is to give the rightful owner
adequate notice of the existence of a cause of action. Without such
notice, it may be inequitable to allow the statute of limitations to
run.200 The standard for determining whether this element has
been met is often formulated as a requirement that the adverse
possessor use the property in the same manner as the rightful
owner would.21
Although this concept, borrowed from the law of real property,
may work reasonably well with land or even with larger chattels,
difficulties arise in its application to smaller chattels. The posses-
sor of smaller items may well use them as a rightful owner would,
yet such use and possession would never serve to give the true
owner the requisite notice to initiate a claim against the posses-
197. O'Keeffe, 170 N.J. Super. at 87, 405 A.2d at 844.
198. Id. To establish title by adverse possession, the possession must be hostile or ad-
verse; actual; visible, notorious, and exclusive; continuous; and under a claim or color of
title. Augustus v. Lydig, 353 Ill. 215, 220, 187 N.E. 278, 281 (1933); see Goen v. Sansbury,
219 Md. 289, 295, 149 A.2d 17, 21 (1959).
199. 170 N.J. Super. at 90, 405 A.2d at 844.
200. Id. at 91, 405 A.2d at 844.
201. The notion that adequate notice is given when the property is used as the rightful
owner would stems from the theory that the community at large can "take notice of" and
presume, at least ostensibly, that the person whom the community views as treating the
land (or other property) as his or her own is, in fact, the rightful owner. Because land is the
primary form of property to which one may establish title by adverse possession, the mat-
ter-of-fact visible quality of the property lends itself to "community notice." See generally 3
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 15.1-.3 (1952). See also Augustus v. Lydig, 353 Ill. at 221,
187 N.E. at 281 (stating that "[u]sing and controlling property as owner is the ordinary
mode of asserting claim of title").
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sor.z1 2 In fact, O'Keeffe argued that for the use to satisfy the ele-
ments of adverse possession, it would have to include public dis-
play of the items, for example in a museum.0 3
On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized that the
difficulties of establishing the elements of adverse possession for
personal property might undermine the purposes of the statute of
limitations and impose too heavy a burden on purchasers of art
works.2 04 The court thus rejected the strict application of adverse
possession doctrine to personal property20 5 and instead chose to
fashion a rule that would be more responsive to the needs of the
art world.20 6 The court also wanted to avoid harsh results caused
by mechanical application of the statute of limitations, particularly
given what it termed "the arcane world of sales of art, where paint-
ings worth vast sums of money sometimes are bought without in-
iquiry about their provenance. ' 207
Recognizing that there is as yet no effective system for the regis-
tration of ownership of art works which would protect the interests
of both owners and prospective good-faith purchasers, the court
adopted the discovery rule to determine the commencement of the
202. See O'Keeffe, 83 N.J. at 495-96, 416 A.2d at 870-72.
203. Id. at 496, 416 A.2d at 871. The conclusion that the defenses of adverse possession
and expiration of the statute of limitations were identical led the dissent at the appellate
level to argue that the appellate court's decision would provide a "handbook" for prospec-
tive art thieves of available art works. 170 N.J. Super. at 95-96, 405 A.2d at 850 (Fritz, J.,
dissenting).
204. O'Keeffe, 83 N.J. at 495-96, 416 A.2d at 870-72. For additional criticism of the appel-
late court decision (before its reversal), see Comment, supra note 191, at 1146-49.
205. 83 N.J. at 496, 416 A.2d at 872. In rejecting application of this doctrine to the
O'Keeffe case, the court overruled Redmond v. New Jersey Historical Soc'y, 132 N.J. Eq.
464, 28 A.2d 189 (1942). Yet Redmond, which applied adverse possession to personal prop-
erty, involved not a theft but the loan of a painting for an indefinite period of time and so
was presumably inappropriate precedent for the O'Keeffe decision. For discussion of Red-
mond, see infra notes 252-53 and accompanying text.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, in deciding a
case involving a Monet painting stolen from Germany during World War II, also distin-
guished a defense based on the expiration of the statute of limitations and a defense based
on adverse possession. The adverse possession defense was rejected because display of the
painting in the possessor's home did not satisfy the "open and notorious" requirement.
DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 658 F. Supp. 688, 693-95, 697 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), rev'd on other
grounds, 836 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1987).
206. O'Keeffe, 83 N.J. at 497, 416 A.2d at 872-73.
207. Id. at 497, 416 A.2d at 872.
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statute of limitations for replevin of a painting.210 The statute thus
would begin to run when "the injured party discovers, or by exer-
cise of reasonable diligence and intelligence should have discov-
ered, facts which form the basis of a cause of action. ' 20 9 The court
remanded the case to the trial court for determination of whether
O'Keeffe had exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to dis-
cover the location of her paintings so as to delay the running of the
statute of limitations.21 0 Application of the discovery rule thereby
focuses attention on the conduct of the original owner rather than
on the conduct of the possessor, and in particular on whether the
owner has acted with due diligence in pursuing his or her claim. 1'
In addition, the burden of proving such diligence is placed on the
owner.
212
The most recent decision to comment on the application of the
statute of limitations to bar a claim for the return of stolen art
works by the original owner does not, however, involve either an
auction house or a dealer. In Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v.
Elicofon,215 the Kunstsammlungen claimed ownership of two
paintings by Albrecht Dfirer, executed in approximately 1499. At
the end of World War II, some American soldiers apparently stole
the paintings, which had been stored in a castle located in what is
now East Germany. The paintings ultimately were sold to Edward
Elicofon, who did not understand either their considerable value or
their uncertain provenance.214 Although the decision was fraught
208. Id. at 493, 416 A.2d at 870.
209. Id. at 491, 416 A.2d at 869.
210. Id. at 493-94, 416 A.2d at 870.
211. Id. at 497, 416 A.2d at 873.
212. Id. Justice Handler based his dissent on the principle that each transfer of the stolen
property constituted a new and different act of tortious conversion. Id. at 511, 416 A.2d at
879-80 (Handler, J., dissenting). The statute of limitations therefore would begin to run
again after each transfer of possession. The majority criticized this approach for failing to
permit "tacking" of the possessions of successive adverse possessors. Id. at 503-04, 416 A.2d
at 875-76. Justice Handler, however, suggested that tacking applied to adverse possession of
personal property only in exceptional circumstances, such as those involving negotiable in-
struments. Id. at 511-12, 416 A.2d at 879-80. He also cited briefly, with approval, the "de-
mand and refusal" rule of Menzel. Id. at 510, 416 A.2d at 879. See supra notes 186-91 and
accompanying text. The majority relied on its analysis of the choice of law issue (New York
or New Jersey) rather than on the validity of the Menzel decision as applied to this area of
law. Id. at 489-90, 416 A.2d at 868.
213. 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982).
214. Id. at 1152-56.
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with several convoluted issues of ownership,215 the only one of im-
port here was whether the claim of the rightful owner was barred
by New York's three-year statute of limitations for recovery of
chattels.216 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit, relying on the "demand and refusal" rule enunciated in Men-
zel, held that the claim was not barred because the demand was
made in October 1966 and the claim was filed in April 1969.217 A
necessary element of this holding was that the demand require-
ment was not merely a procedural requirement but rather a sub-
stantive one.218 Finally, the court rejected the argument that this
rule favored the thief over the bona fide purchaser because "famil-
iar principles of equitable estoppel will prevent a wrongdoer from
asserting the statute of limitations defense and thereby 'tak[ing]
refuge behind the shield of his own wrong.' "219 Although the Sec-
ond Circuit admitted that it was limited by New York law and did
not have the ability to change the law to comport with relevant
policies, the court was clear that Menzel still appeared to be good
law in New York and that the "demand and refusal" rule was not
as open to criticism as had at times been implied.2 °
215. These issues involved whether the Kunstsammlungen or the Grand Duchess of Sax-
ony-Weimar was the rightful owner of the paintings. Id. at 1153-60. Ownership was resolved
in favor of the Kunstsammlungen. Id. at 1160. For further discussion of these issues, see
Note, Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon: Theft of Priceless Art Treasures Gives
Rise to Protracted International Legal Battle, 19 TEx. INT'L L.J. 189, 191-201 (1984).
216. Elicofon, 678 F.2d at 1160. In 1946, at the time Elicofon purchased the paintings, the
applicable limitation period was six years. Id. at 1161 & n.19.
217. Id. at 1161.
218. Id. Because the demand was considered a substantive requirement for accrual of the
action, the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the demand was made. See supra
text accompanying notes 186-91. For criticism of this doctrinal interpretation, see Comment,
supra note 191, at 1137-38. The court clearly considered Menzel to represent the prevailing
law in New York and rejected Elicofon's contention that the "demand and refusal" rule had
been undermined by subsequent decisions. 678 F.2d at 1162-63.
Another case presenting factually similar circumstances to those of Elicofon was also de-
cided on the basis of New York's "demand and refusal" rule. In addition, the court seemed
to require that the plaintiff exercise due diligence in locating the stolen art work and mak-
ing demand for its return once its location had been ascertained. DeWeerth v. Baldinger,
658 F. Supp. 688, 693-95. See supra note 205.
219. Elicofon, 678 F.2d at 1163 (quoting General Stencils, Inc. v. Chiappa, 18 N.Y.2d 125,
127, 219 N.E.2d 169, 170, 272 N.Y.S.2d 337, 339 (1966)). Cf. supra text accompanying notes
190-91 (discussing criticisms of the Menzel holding).
220. Elicofon, 678 F.2d at 1160, 1162-64 & nn. 22-25. The court also based its holding on
the alternate point that the statute of limitations was tolled under New York's judicially
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2. Entrustment
In attempting to fashion a satisfactory rule for adjudication of
the rights between an owner of stolen art works and the innocent
purchaser, the court in O'Keeffe rejected the strict application of
the doctrine of adverse possession and chose to apply the discovery
rule to the mandate of the statute of limitation. The court thus
sought to encourage prospective purchasers of art works to buy
from legitimate art dealers and thereby discourage trafficking in
stolen art works.22' This goal is further enhanced by the treatment
of entrustment situations under the U.C.C.
Entrustment arises when, contrary to the situation of theft, the
owner intends to pass possession, although not title, of personal
property to a merchant who deals in goods of that kind. Under
U.C.C. section 2-403(2), a bona fide purchaser who purchases such
property in the ordinary course of business may receive good title
to it even as against the original owner.222 The theory underlying
this result is that the owner has given the merchant the indicia of
ownership and therefore takes the risk that his or her property
created "non-recognition" toll until 1974, when the United States first recognized the gov-
ernment of the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), of which the Kunstsamm-
lungen zu Weimar was considered to be an agent. Id. at 1164; Note, supra note 215, at 206-
07.
221. O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 83 N.J. 478, 497, 416 A.2d 862, 872-73 (1980). Exactly how the
decision in O'Keeffe will encourage that goal may be unclear. Nevertheless, the court stated:
"The interplay between the statute of limitations as modified by the discovery rule and the
U.C.C. should encourage good faith purchases from legitimate art dealers and discourage
trafficking in stolen art without frustrating an artist's ability to recover stolen art works."
Id., 416 A.2d at 873.
Among the reforms urged by the court in O'Keeffe as well as by other individuals and
organizations involved in the art market is the establishment of a national registration sys-
tem for art works. Not only would such a system help the prospective purchaser determine
the state of title for art works, it also would establish the means by which an owner from
whom an 'art work was stolen could diligently pursue his or her claim to the piece. See
Meyer, For a National Art Registry, N.Y. Times, July 30, 1986, at A22, col. 1. As Meyer
points out, the statute of limitations controversy also has significance for foreign nations
that attempt to recover illegally exported archaeological objects. Id.
222. U.C.C. § 2-403(2) states: "Any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who
deals in goods of that kind gives him power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer
in ordinary course of business." Section 2-403(3) defines "entrusting" as including "any de-
livery and any acquiescence in retention of possession regardless of any condition expressed
between the parties to the delivery or acquiescence and regardless of whether the procure-
ment of the entrusting or the possessor's disposition of the goods have been such as to be
larcenous under the criminal law."
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may be sold with good title passing to the bona fide purchaser.22 3
Entrustment difficulties arise frequently in the context of the art
market because both artists and art collectors "leave" art works
with auction houses and dealers on consignment to display and sell
the work. Although the relationship between artist or owner and
dealer is generally regulated by private contract, when the relation-
ship is not clearly defined, an entrustment situation can occur.
One such situation arose in Porter v. Wertz.224 The plaintiff,
Porter, was an art collector and had had prior dealings with one
Harold Von Maker, who at the time was using the alias Peter
Wertz.225 Porter temporarily gave a Utrillo painting to Von Maker
while Von Maker was deciding whether to purchase it. 226 When a
note given by Von Maker to Porter to finance a previous purchase
was dishonored, Porter investigated Von Maker, learned his true
identity, and attempted to have the Utrillo painting returned.2
Porter and Von Maker, through their attorneys, then worked out a
new agreement that permitted Von Maker to keep the Utrillo for
ninety days while it was on consignment with a client. Von Maker
was then to return the painting or pay Porter $30,000. In addition,
Von Maker's attorney held another painting in escrow which was
to be sold in partial satisfaction of the amount owed to Porter if
Von Maker failed to return the painting or pay Porter.2
Von Maker, acting through the real Peter Wertz, had, in fact,
already sold the painting to Feigen Gallery for $20,000. Feigen
then sold the painting to another defendant, Brenner, who again
sold it, with the result that the painting was exported to Vene-
zuela. 9 When Porter subsequently sued to recover the painting or
its value, Feigen attempted to defend on the grounds of statutory
223. Under the doctrine of common law or equitable estoppel, an innocent purchaser does
not acquire title as against the original owner "unless there has been some affirmative act by
the owner which either creates apparent authority to sell the property in the seller or
clothes the seller with the indicia of ownership." Olin Corp. v. Cargo Carriers, Inc., 673
S.W.2d 211, 216 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
224. 68 A.D.2d 141, 416 N.Y.S.2d 254 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979), aff'd, 53 N.Y.2d 696, 421
N.E.2d 500, 439 N.Y.S.2d 105 (1981).
225. Porter, 68 A.D.2d at 143, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 255.
226. Id. at 143, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 255-56.
227. Id. at 143-44, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 256.
228. Id. at 144-45, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 256.
229. Id. at 145, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 256.
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estoppel, embodied in section 2-403(2) of the U.C.C.230 For this
section to apply, Feigen had to establish that Wertz qualified as a
merchant-that is, "a person who deals in goods of the
kind" 2 1-and that Feigen qualified as a "buyer in the ordinary
course of business. "232
The court held that this defense failed for two reasons. First,
Wertz was not an art dealer and thus did not fit the definition of a
merchant who deals in goods of the kind.2 3 Second, Feigen could
not qualify as a person who had dealt in good faith. U.C.C. section
2-103(1)(b) defines "good faith" for a merchant as "honesty in fact
and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing in the trade. '23 4 The appellate court stated that although
this definition countenanced the commercial standards of the
trade, "it should not-and cannot-be interpreted to permit, coun-
tenance or condone commercial standards of sharp trade practice
or indifference as to the 'provenance' . such as is present in the
case before us. '2
35
230. Id., 416 N.Y.S.2d at 257. This section provides that "[a]ny entrusting of possession
of goods to a merchant who deals in goods of that kind gives him power to transfer all rights
of the entruster to a buyer in ordinary course of business." U.C.C. § 2-403(2) (1978).
231. U.C.C. § 2-104(1).
232. Porter, 68 A.D.2d at 145-46, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 257. This term is defined in U.C.C. § 1-
201(9) as "a person who in good faith and without knowledge that the sale to him is in
violation of the ownership rights ... of a third party in the goods buys in ordinary course
from a person in the business of selling goods of that kind. .. ."
233. The appellate court stated that "[ijf anything, [Wertz] was a delicatessen employee
. . .a seller of caviar and other luxury food items... over whom... Von Maker 'cast his
hypnotic spell. . . and usurped his name, his signature and his sacred honor.'" 68 A.D.2d
at 145-46 & n.6, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 257 & n.6.
234. U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b).
235. Porter, 68 A.D. 2d at 146, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 257. The appellate court thus held that it
was not a reasonable commercial practice for Feigen to fail to determine Wertz's status as
an art merchant or to inquire as to the provenance of the Utrillo painting. Id. at 149, 416
N.Y.S.2d at 259. On appeal, however, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the appellate
court on the basis of its holding that Wertz was not an art merchant and declined to reach
the issue of Feigen's good faith. Porter v. Wertz, 53 N.Y.2d 696, 700-01, 421 N.E.2d 500,
501-02, 439 N.Y.S.2d 105, 106-07 (1981). It is interesting that both the New York Attorney
General and the Art Dealers Association of America, Inc. filed amicus curiae briefs for this
appeal. Id. at 701, 421 N.E.2d at 502, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 107. The Attorney General argued
that the court should hold that good faith among art merchants requires inquiry as to the
ownership of an art work, whereas the Art Dealers Association urged that "the ordinary
custom in the art business is not to inquire as to title and that a duty of inquiry would
cripple the art business which is centered in New York." Id. This result seems to follow
what may be a somewhat typical pattern in these cases. Courts appear reluctant to interfere
548
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The second defense put forth was based on the doctrine of equi-
table estoppel, according to which the title to property of a good-
faith purchaser for value cannot be questioned by the original
owner if the owner has endowed the seller with possession and the
apparent authority to convey title.236 The appellate court held that
Porter's conduct was not blameworthy and that, more specifically,
Porter had only lent the painting to Von Maker for private display
in his own home. He thus did not confer any indicia of ownership
on Von Maker, and mere possession, without more, was insufficient
to create an estoppel.57 The court therefore rejected the defenses
of statutory and equitable estoppel.23s An art dealer or other
merchant in the art market would need to inquire of the seller the
state of the title and to investigate, at least to a limited extent, the
provenance of art works the dealer undertakes to handle. 239 The
Court of Appeals in Porter could have gone further in setting a
higher standard of investigation as a reasonable commercial prac-
tice. The merchant, nonetheless, will be liable to the true owner of
an art work if the merchant deals with unknown individuals under
questionable circumstances without inquiring further into the
background and legitimacy of the title to a work.
The final case that considers these issues involved an entrust-
ment or bailment of a painting by the original artist which ulti-
mately lasted 59 years. In Mucha v. King,240 Alphonse Mucha, a
painter and perhaps originator of the Art Nouveau style, in 1920
consigned a painting entitled "Quo Vadis" to the Newcomb-Mack-
lin gallery, a dealer located in Chicago. Under the original terms of
with anything that is termed standard practice in the art market industry, even if such
practice becomes a shield behind which art dealers and auction houses can hide from the
imposition of legal liability. The appellate court, however, commented that "commercial in-
difference to ownership or the right to sell facilitates traffic in stolen works of art. Commer-
cial indifference diminishes the integrity and increases the culpability of the apathetic
merchant." 68 A.D.2d at 149, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 259.
236. Porter, 68 A.D.2d at 148, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 258 (citing Zendman v. Harry Winston,
Inc., 305 N.Y. 180, 187, 111 N.E.2d 871, 875 (1953), and 46 An JuR. Sales § 463 (1943)).
237. Id. at 148-49, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 258-59. The New York Court of Appeals emphasized
that Porter had not given the painting to Wertz and had not done anything to induce Fei-
gen to believe that Wertz was a merchant entitled to convey good title to the painting. 53
N.Y.2d at 700, 421 N.E.2d at 501-02, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 106-07.
238. 68 A.D.2d at 147, 149, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 258, 259.
239. Comment, Title Disputes, supra note 119, at 448-50.
240. 792 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1986).
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the consignment agreement, the consignee was to pay Mucha a
predetermined price for this and other art works and could then
keep whatever additional profit was realized when the art works
were sold. Perhaps anticipating that the paintings would appreci-
ate in value, the gallery placed "Quo Vadis" and other works by
Mucha in storage. Mucha, who was a native and resident of Czech-
oslovakia, and the gallery owner corresponded intermittently until
Mucha's death in 1939. Although some items were shipped back to
Czechoslovakia or otherwise disposed of, "Quo Vadis" seems to
have remained in Chicago.241
The defendant, King, argued that the correspondence between
Mucha and the dealer indicated that Newcomb-Macklin had con-
verted the painting by falling to follow Mucha's instructions. The
district court, however, interpreted the tone of these letters other-
wise and held that Mucha was still the owner of the painting at the
time of his death.242 Further intermittent communication between
the gallery and Mucha's son, Jiri, culminated in a visit by Jiri to
the gallery in 1973. At that point, however, neither Jiri nor the
gallery seemed to be aware of the existence of "Quo Vadis" in the
gallery's storage.243 In 1979, the gallery gave the painting to a hot
tubs merchant, who in turn sold it to the art dealer from whom
King bought it in 1981 for $35,000 in cash and merchandise. 44 In
1981 or 1982, a friend of King contacted Jiri to inquire about some
of the symbolism in the painting.245 Jiri investigated the painting
and traced it to King. He then initiated a suit against King in
1983, seeking the return of the painting. The value of the painting
was variously estimated at trial to be between $100,000 and
$800,000.246
The salient legal issue raised by these facts was whether Jiri's
suit was barred by the running of the statute of limitations.247
King conceded that the statute of limitations would not begin to
241. Id. at 606-08.
242. Id. at 609.
243. Id. at 611.
244. Id. at 604, 612.
245. Id. at 612-13. In one place the court puts Jiri's discovery of the painting's existence
in 1982 and elsewhere as 1981. Id.
246. Id. at 604.
247. Id. at 606.
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run until the bailor discovered or should have discovered that the
bailee had converted the property. 4" Nevertheless, King argued
that the statute had begun to run, at the latest, in 1973 when Jiri
failed to find the painting at the gallery or in its storage; the suit
therefore would have been barred by the five-year limitation pe-
riod. 4" The underlying issue the court needed to resolve concerned
when the consignment or bailment had become a conversion so as
to trigger the running of the statute of limitations.
As was discussed previously in connection with the Cristallina
decision, the relationship between an auction house and the seller
is that of an agent to its principal.2 50 For an agent's conduct to
constitute conversion, the agent must do more than simply use the
principal's property openly and notoriously in the same manner as
the owner would. Because such conduct is consistent with the
agency relationship, the agent who would convert the principal's
property not only must act adversely to the ownership interest of
the principal but also must clearly communicate such adverse use
to the principal.2 51
The principles involving conversion in the context of a bailment
or agency relationship are explained more clearly in two decisions
248. Id. at 611-12. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit implied
that this concession was unwise. Referring to the New Jersey Supreme Court's adoption of a
discovery rule to modify the statute of limitations in the O'Keeffe decision, see supra notes
208-12 and accompanying text, the Seventh Circuit questioned whether an Illinois court
would have done the same in this case, because the passage of time and the death of many
of the principals had created considerable problems of proof. Mucha, 792 F.2d at 612. If the
hot tub merchant had been a purchaser in the ordinary course of business, then King might
have relied on the principle that once the owner has entrusted a painting to a merchant who
regularly deals in goods of that kind, the merchant can pass title to a bona fide purchaser
and this title would be good even as against the original owner. Id. The appellate court did
not decide whether King bought in the ordinary course of business but implied that the
mere fact that King purchased the painting from a dealer doing business under the none-
too-reassuring name of "Fly-by-Nite" would not in itself destroy King's status as a bona fide
purchaser. Id. The court also noted that King might have a cause of action against the
owner of Fly-by-Nite for breach of warranty of title. Id.
249. Id. at 612.
250. See supra text accompanying notes 162-65.
251. For example, in the case of a bailment, the bailee may possess the bailor's property
for an indefinite period of time, and conversion occurs only when he or she violates the
terms of the bailment agreement. Furthermore, a court need not imply a time limitation in
the agreement if an indefinite bailment is consistent with the nature of the property and the
parties' intentions. Estate of McCagg, 450 A.2d 414, 416-17 & n.3 (D.C. 1982).
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concerning loans of art works to a museum for an indefinite period
of time. In Redmond v. New Jersey Historical Society,2 2 a Gilbert
Stuart portrait had been in the possession of the Society from 1887
until 1938, when the descendants of the owner demanded its re-
turn. The court held that under the doctrine of adverse possession,
the Society had not acted inconsistently with the claims of the true
owners until it refused their request for return of the portrait. The
statute of limitations therefore did not begin to run until the Soci-
ety's possession became adverse and hostile to the owners'
interest.2 53
Essentially the same reasoning was applied in Estate of Mc-
Cagg.254 In McCagg, two paintings had been given on indefinite
loan to the National Museum of American Art in 1917. The owner
of the paintings died in 1932 and her descendants did not learn of
the paintings' existence until 1979. They demanded their return in
1981 and brought suit within two weeks of the Museum's refusal to
return them. 55 Without explicitly invoking the doctrine of adverse
possession, the court held that the claimants' cause of action was
not complete until the Museum acted inconsistently with the
terms of the bailment agreement by refusing to return the paint-
ings and that therefore the claim was not barred by the statute of
limitations.256 The court did not apply the O'Keeffe discovery rule
and relied instead on the demand and refusal rule, reasoning that
until the bailee acted inconsistently with the bailor's claim to title
there would be nothing for the bailor to "discover" and the facts
necessary to create the cause of action would not yet have
occurred. 57
The reasoning in these cases points out the essential difference
between a theft and a bailment or consignment of art works. In the
former, the owner presumably knows from the beginning that a
theft has occurred, and one may reasonably argue that the cause of
action accrues at that time. In the O'Keeffe case, the harsh result
caused by running the statute of limitations from the time of theft
252. 132 N.J. Eq. 464, 28 A.2d 189 (1942).
253. Id. at 473-75, 28 A.2d at 189, 195.
254. 450 A.2d 414 (D.C. 1982).
255. Id. at 415.
256. Id. at 416, 419.
257. Id. at 416, 418-19.
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was mitigated by the discovery rule because the victim had not
known the identity of the thief (or the subsequent possessor). The
court thus considered the cause of action incomplete. 58 In the case
of a bailment or consignment, however, no cause of action exists
until the bailee or agent acts inconsistently with the terms of the
bailment or consignment-usually by refusing to return the prop-
erty at the owner's request-and thereby commits a conversion.
Although the court in Mucha failed to state these principles of
agency and bailment clearly, they seem to be applicable because
both the district court and the appellate court refused to interpret
the gallery's failure to follow Mucha's instructions as a conver-
sion.2 59 The court seemed to be searching for an unequivocal action
or communication from the gallery to Mucha that would indicate
the requisite hostility or adverse use on the part of the gallery. The
court therefore held that the conversion did not occur until either
the gallery's disposal of the painting in 1979 or Jiri's realization of
this in 1981, so that Jiri's claim was not time-barred.260
The significance of the Mucha decision therefore rests on its im-
plicit characterization of the underlying relationship between the
artist or consignor of a work of art and the auction house or dealer.
This relationship was clearly established in the Cristallina case
and less clearly stated but still necessary to the result in the
Mucha decision. Once this relationship is viewed as one of agency
and fiduciary responsibilities, many legal conclusions flow which
make the adjudication of disputes or controversies between the
parties easier to resolve. In attempting to determine the liabilities
of an auction house or art dealer to the purchaser, the relationship
with the seller may be used as a model and will be considered in
the next section.
IV. LIABILITY OF ART MERCHANTS
The preceding analysis concluded that because an agency and
fiduciary relationship exists between the auctioneer and the origi-
nal owner or consignor of a work of art, the interests of the owner
receives adequate legal protection. The purchaser of a work of art
258. O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 83 N.J. 478, 485, 416 A.2d 862, 869-70 (1980).
259. Mucha v. King, 792 F.2d 602, 609-12 (7th Cir. 1986).
260. Id. at 613.
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through such an intermediary, however, does not seem to receive
equivalent protection. Because the auctioneer is the agent of the
owner or consignor, no particular obligation is owed to the
buyer.26 1 Both the common law and most statutory schemes, as ex-
emplified by the U.C.C., put the burden on the purchaser to estab-
lish that the merchant has made a warranty that is actionable if
the statement turns out to be inaccurate. 2  Only New York and
Michigan,263 whose statutes go significantly beyond the U.C.C.,
have specifically confronted the particular issues and problems
raised by the practices of the art market.264
Although at the beginning of this Article the terms "dealer" and
"auctioneer" were used interchangeably, 26 5 it may be necessary at
this point to introduce the traditional distinctions between these
terms. An art dealer usually purchases an art work from the owner
or artist at a definite price and then sells it to a purchaser on his or
her own behalf, rather than on behalf of the original owner or art-
ist.2 66 Works of art sold in this manner generally are considered to
command a higher price than if sold at public auction. Although
the dealer, as owner, has an explicit financial stake in the art work,
261. If the buyer suffers a loss, the law traditionally would dictate that the buyer should
attempt to recover from the original owner. This result unfortunately ignores the reality
that the owner's identity may be secret and, more problematical, the owner may be judg-
ment proof, whether by insolvency, absence from the jurisdiction, or any other reason.
262. See supra notes 50-81 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 82-92 and accompanying text.
264. The establishment of a national registry for works of art also has been proposed as a
possible solution to the peculiar problems raised by the art market. In 1966, Congress con-
sidered legislation to establish such a registry. See Comment, Title Disputes, supra note
119, at 458-63 (also discussing such registries and other art theft archives maintained by
various organizations, including the Art Dealers Association of America, the FBI, IN-
TERPOL, and the International Foundation for Art Research). See also Meyer, supra note
221 (also urging establishment of such an art registry).
Such a system would provide all owners and prospective purchasers of art works with a
centralized registry where proper title and provenance could be established and checked.
Unfortunately, such a system would work only in a prospective fashion, primarily benefit-
ting art works registered at the time of their creation by the original artist, who could per-
sonally verify the work's authenticity. Clearly the value of such a registration system would
diminish for older art works and antiquities. Although the creation of such a national or
even international registration system would reduce such problems for newer works of art, it
would not help in the area of older works, where the potential for abusive practices is much
greater.
265. See supra note 10.
266. Id.
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he or she is also held to a higher standard of obligation to the pur-
chaser in establishing the title and authenticity of the art work.
This may be seen as a counterbalance to the higher price, in ex-
change for which the purchaser can rely on and reasonably expect
greater protection from the dealer.
An auction house, on the other hand, generally does not
purchase the art work itself, and therefore it has no direct financial
stake in the work.26 7 Its financial interest is based solely on the
commission it receives for selling the item, although the commis-
sion will be greater if the object sells at a higher price. The price
may be lower than if the same object were sold through a dealer,
but the purchaser is considered to have-assumed a greater risk as
to the authenticity of the art work.2 68
This dichotomy may also be reflected in a consideration of
whether the term "merchant" as used in the U.C.C. would apply
equally to both dealers and auctioneers. Section 2-104(1) defines a
"merchant" as one "who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by
his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill pecu-
liar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction."269 One
question this definition raises is whether a dealer or auctioneer
would be considered a merchant with respect to all types of art
works and antiquities or only those of a particular specialized pe-
riod or genre. More significant, however, is whether an auctioneer,
as opposed to a dealer, would be considered under the U.C.C. defi-
nition to be an art merchant-that is, one with particular knowl-
edge or skill concerning art-or simply one who is skilled in the
practice of auctioneering.
Nevertheless, this distinction between dealers and auctioneers is
diminishing for several reasons. First, the differences in methods of
operation by dealers and auction houses are blurred by several
267. Id.
268. See, for example, the comments of the judge in Weisz v. Parke-Bernet Galleries, 77
Misc. 2d 80, 81, 351 N.Y.S.2d 911, 912 (N.Y. App. Term 1974); supra text accompanying
note 41.
269. This section also considers a merchant to be one "to whom such knowledge or skill
may be attributed by his employment of an agent or broker or other intermediary who by
his occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge or skill." U.C.C. § 2-104(1)
(1978). This refers to the standard to be applied to a principal who employs an agent who
qualifies under the first part of § 2-104(1) as a merchant.
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changes in accepted practices."' Auction houses purchase art
works to resell on their own behalf and thus gain a direct financial
interest in the objects, although they are required to inform pro-
spective purchasers of this before the sale.2" 1 On the other hand,
dealers and galleries offer for sale objects given to them on con-
signment and thus operate on a system comparable to that of the
auction houses. 72 The New York and Michigan statutes recognize
this fact by explicitly applying their standards uniformly to the
generic term "art merchant," which encompasses dealers, galleries,
and auction houses .273 These developments have led at least one
commentator to conclude that "the auction house must be gov-
erned by the same standard as the dealer and gallery. 2 74
This breakdown in the practical distinctions between dealers
and auctioneers is reflected in the elimination of the legal distinc-
tions between the consequences applied to their respective roles.
As was previously discussed, the remedies fashioned by the courts
in the Menzel, Cristallina, and Rothko decisions, which involved
both dealers and auctioneers, buyers and owners, were essentially
the same-that is, the courts gave the injured parties their choice
of rescission or full expectation damages and awarded those dam-
ages on the basis of the appreciated or depreciated value of the art
works.275 This result was not unusual in the Rothko decision, which
involved the actions of estate executors who were thus clearly fidu-
ciaries. In Cristallina, the relationship between an auction house
and the consignor also was characterized as that of an agent or
fiduciary. Even more significantly, in Menzel the relationship be-
tween a dealer and a purchaser established the basis for compara-
ble liability.
270. Comment, supra note 124, at 151.
271. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
272. Comment, supra note 124, at 151 (citing Jeanneret v. Vichey, 541 F. Supp. 80
(S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 693 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1982) in which the dealer had sometimes accepted
paintings on consignment).
273. Section 11.01(2) of the New York statute defines an art merchant as one "who is in
the business of dealing ... in works of fine art" and specifically includes auctioneers. N.Y.
ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 11.01(2) (McKinney Supp. 1988). Section 442.321(1)(a) of the
Michigan statute uses similar language and also specifically includes auctioneers. MICH.
Comp. LAWS ANN. § 442.321(1)(a) (West Supp. 1987).
274. Comment, supra note 124, at 151 (footnotes omitted).
275. See supra text accompanying notes 120, 179-84.
[Vol. 29:501
REGULATION OF THE ART MARKET
This trend toward diminishing distinctions is also apparent in a
comparison of the results in the Cristallina and Mucha decisions.
Both cases involved the relationship of the consignor of art
works-in Mucha, to a dealer; in Cristallina, to an auction
house.27 6 Yet both decisions depended on the characterization of
this relationship as an agency relationship.277 A comparison of all
four decisions indicates that the relationship between dealer and
owner, dealer and buyer, and auction house and owner should be
subject to the same legal framework. The only missing "prong" in
this quartet is the relationship between auction house and buyer.
The Abrams case might have clarified this relationship but did not
because of the out-of-court settlement. The judge's comments in
granting the preliminary injunction, however, may indicate a will-
ingness to impose on the auction house a specific obligation to the
purchaser.17
These recent decisions, coupled with the diminution in practical
distinctions between dealers and auctioneers, may lead to the for-
mulation of a single theory of potential liability that would apply
equally to both dealers and auctioneers and would regulate the re-
lationship of the art merchant to both the owner and the purchaser
of art works. Several such theories may be proposed and the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of each will be discussed in turn.
The first such theory is based on agency principles. As previ-
ously considered, an auction house acts as the agent of the owner
and clearly owes a fiduciary duty to the owner. This theory would
characterize the relationship between the art merchant and the
purchaser as an agency relationship as well. The art merchant
276. The fact that in Mucha the paintings were on consignment to the dealer illustrates
that a dealer can act like an auction house and justifies the similar legal treatment accorded
to a dealer and an auctioneer.
277. Mucha v. King, 729 F.2d 602, 609-13 (7th Cir. 1986); Cristallina S.A. v. Christie,
Manson & Woods Int'l, Inc., 117 A.D.2d 284, 291-92, 502 N.Y.S.2d 165, 171 (N.Y. App. Div.
1986).
278. Whether such liability would have been based on a characterization of Sotheby's
actions as constituting fraud and misrepresentation and perhaps violating New York City's
ordinance regulating the conduct of auctions, or on the imposition of some higher standard
of duty, cannot be determined. The specific relevant issue in Abrams would have been
whether Sotheby's had adequately disclosed to prospective purchasers the questionable title
of the auctioned items. See Abrams v. Sotheby Parke-Bernet, Inc., No. 42255-84, slip op. at
6 n.1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 24, 1984) (granting preliminary injunction).
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therefore would act as the agent for both parties. The primary ob-
jection to the imposition of such an agency relationship is that if
the auctioneer were to act as the agent of both the owner and the
buyer, there would be considerable potential for conflict of
interest. 79
The answer to this objection is perhaps that the buyer often re-
lies on the auctioneer's expertise and reputation whether or not
the law recognizes the existence of a formal agency relationship.
Certainly in real estate sales, a broker, who under traditional legal
principles is recognized as the agent only of the seller, often acts
on behalf of both the buyer and the seller, regardless of whether
the law grants any legal recognition of this dual relationship.280 Re-
cent decisions, however, now recognize this duality by imposing an
agency relationship on the cooperating broker when the buyer, in
fact, views the broker as his or her agent.2"' A California appellate
court has gone even further in characterizing the listing broker as
owing a fiduciary obligation and thus an affirmative duty of inves-
tigation and disclosure to the buyer. 2 In some unusual cases in-
volving the art market, a broker, auctioneer, or other employee of
279. See supra note 10. A second objection is that if the art merchant is selling objects he
or she owns, then as a party to the transaction the merchant cannot act as agent of the
other party. Romani v. Harris, 255 Md. 389, 394-97, 258 A.2d 187, 190 (1969). For this rea-
son, a tort or warranty theory, see infra notes 285-300 and accompanying text, may be bet-
ter suited to the art market.
280. For a discussion of the real estate broker's relationship to both buyer and seller, see
Comment, The Real Estate Broker's Fiduciary Duties: An Examination of Current Indus-
try Standards and Practices, 12 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 145 (1984).
281. In Cashion v. Ahmadi, 345 So. 2d 268, 271 (Ala. 1977), the court remanded to the
trial court for a factual finding as to whether the cooperating broker acted as the agent of
the buyers, regardless of whether it was also the agent of the sellers; if the broker was the
buyers' agent, then it owed the buyers a duty of faithfulness to disclose defects in the house
that buyers had purchased.
282. Easton v. Strassburger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 99, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383, 388 (1984). This
decision was based on an earlier California decision in which the court held that if the
seller's broker or agent knew of a material defect in the property of which the buyer was not
aware, then the broker had a duty to disclose the defect to the buyer. Lingsch v. Savage, 213
Cal. App. 2d 729, 735-36, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201, 204-05 (1963); Comment, Broker Liability after
Easton v. Strassburger: Let the Buyer Be Aware, 25 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 651, 654-55 (1985).
California subsequently limited by statute the broker's duty to investigate and disclose de-
fects. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2079-2079.5 (West Supp. 1987). Cf. Browder v. Hanley Dawson
Cadillac Co., 62 Ill. App. 3d 623, 629, 379 N.E.2d 1206, 1211 (1978) (an insurance broker, as
opposed to an agent, acts as the agent of the purchaser rather than of the insurance com-
pany and so owes a fiduciary duty to the buyer).
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an auction house also has been held to act as agent for the
buyer. 83 Extension of such liability to the art merchant in the
form of a fiduciary obligation would offer several advantages.
The primary advantage in adoption of an agency or fiduciary
analysis would be the flexibility it would afford in different circum-
stances. Rather than making the auction house liable as an insurer
of authenticity to all buyers, this theory would adapt to situations
in which the buyer reasonably regarded the auction house as acting
on its behalf. Such a characterization might depend, for example,
on the relative sophistication of the buyer. The buyer could be a
first-time amateur collector or an art dealer or museum that is very
well aware of the risks involved and has participated often in such
auctions. Relief for the buyer should perhaps depend on the extent
to which the buyer actually relies on the auction house's knowledge
and expertise. If the buyer is as sophisticated as the auction house,
then one might question why such a high standard of fiduciary ob-
ligation should be imposed on the auctioneer. A factual determina-
tion would have to be made as to whether the purchaser had rea-
sonably relied on and viewed the auctioneer as acting as his or her
agent, as the court in Cashion v. Ahmadi required in the context of
determining the liability of a real estate broker.84 Although this
theory may at times present complex problems of proof, it would
allow the unsophisticated purchaser some protection and limit the
liability of the art merchant to situations in which it actually has
superior knowledge and resources. Such flexibility would, however,
come at the cost of decreased certainty and increased litigation in-
volving factual determinations as to whether the purchaser re-
garded the art merchant as his or her agent.
The second theory is one of strict liability based on tort notions
of enterprise responsibility and the best cost-avoider and cost-
283. For example, in Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc. v. Franklyn, 26 N.Y.2d 13, 256 N.E.2d
506, 308 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1970), the court held that an out-of-state bidder was represented at
an auction by, and so was bound by the acts of, the auctioneer's employee who carried out
the bidder's telephoned instructions, and thus the employee acted as the bidder's agent. Id.
at 18-19, 256 N.E.2d at 509, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 341-42. See also Romani v. Harris, 255 Md.
389, 394-97, 258 A.2d 187, 190-91 (1969) (an auctioneer, when selling goods on behalf of the
owner, can act as agent of the buyer so as to bind the buyer to the sale terms; the clerk of an
auctioneer who owns the goods can also act as the buyer's agent).
284. 345 So. 2d at 271.
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spreader. 85 The policy underlying the development of this theory
depends on the unequal bargaining position between a manufac-
turer or other individual who places goods into the stream of com-
merce and the consumer of a particular product. This doctrine is
also justified by the superior ability of the manufacturer either to
avoid the loss or to absorb and spread the costs of those losses that
are unavoidable.
Although this theory may resolve certain problems, one major
difficulty lies in the essential nature of the strict liability in tort
theory. The judicial trend is to limit its application to situations in
which the product is inherently defective and unreasonably dan-
gerous and the losses involve personal injury or property damage;
pure economic loss, on the other hand, is to be regulated by the
commercial law of sales.286
285. See, e.g., Spring Motors Distrib., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., Inc., 98 N.J. 555, 568, 489
A.2d 660, 666-67 (1985); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1960); Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine, Function and
Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REV. 1109, 1258-63, 1375-78 (1974).
286. See, e.g., Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17
(1965); Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697 (1962); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1964). Section 402B(a) creates strict
liability for the seller of chattels who makes a misrepresentation, even if without fault, con-
cerning a material fact. The imposition of such liability, however, still requires physical
harm and therefore would still not be relevant to the art market context. Cf. Santor v. A. &
M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 59-60, 207 A.2d 305, 312 (1965); Rabin & Grossman,
Defective Products or Realty Causing Economic Loss: Toward a Unified Theory of Recov-
ery, 12 Sw. U.L. REV. 5, 9 (1980-1981) (arguing that no distinction should be made based on
type of injury or damages suffered but that strict liability still should be limited to personal
injury).
New Jersey, formerly the leading jurisdiction in advocating the application of strict liabil-
ity in tort for pure economic loss, seems to have departed considerably from this view in a
recent decision, Spring Motors Distrib., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 98 N.J. 555, 489 A.2d 660
(1985). In this decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that in a commercial transac-
tion, a purchaser suffering pure economic loss would need to sue in contract under the
U.C.C. provisions for express and implied warranties, although it eliminated any contractual
privity requirement. Id. at 569-75, 489 A.2d at 668-72. The court relied on the significant
policy considerations that strict liability should protect only purchasers with unequal bar-
gaining position and that the U.C.C. intended to "make uniform throughout the United
States the law governing commercial transactions" by "constitut[ing] a comprehensive sys-
tem for determining the rights and duties of buyers and sellers with respect to contracts for
the sale of goods." Id. at 565, 489 A.2d at 665. It is unclear whether the other jurisdictions
that had followed New Jersey's earlier, more expansive interpretation of strict liability will
now follow its more restrictive approach. These jurisdictions include Ohio, Michigan, and
Wisconsin. Id. at 574, 489 A.2d at 669-70. For application of this argument specifically to
the art market, see Comment, U.C.C. Warranty Provisions, supra note 9, at 551-54.
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There is, however, some precedent for applying a strict tort lia-
bility for misrepresentations made by a seller concerning chattels
that result in pure economic loss. The primary source for such a
strict liability can be found in a proposed section of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts, section 552D.287 This section was intended
to parallel sections 402A (involving defective products) and 402B
(involving misrepresentations that result in physical injury). 8
Section 552D apparently never was adopted but was cited with ap-
proval in at least one decision."' However, such a precedent may
provide the inspiration for fashioning a theory of strict liability for
misrepresentation in the sale of chattels which would apply in the
art market context, regardless of whether such liability would be
classified as sounding in warranty or in tort.29
287. The proposed section, entitled "Misrepresentation by Seller of Chattels to Public,"
states:
One engaged in the business of selling chattels who, by advertising, labels or
otherwise, makes to the public a misrepresentation of a material fact concern-
ing the character or quality of a chattel sold by him is subject to liability for
pecuniary loss caused to another by his purchase of the chattel in justifiable
reliance upon the misrepresentation, even though it is not made fraudulently
or negligently.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552D (Council Draft No. 17, at 76 (1963), quoted in
Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 217 Tenn. 400, 414-16, 398 S.W.2d 240, 246-47 (1966), and in
Shapo, supra note 285, at 1144.
288. Comment a to § 552D makes the comments to § 402B applicable to pecuniary loss.
Lonon, 217 Tenn. at 414-16, 398 S.W.2d at 247. The comments to § 402B set up several
parameters for its application. Section 402B comment i eliminates the contractual require-
ment of privity. Further, liability under § 402B may not be disclaimed, and the consumer is
not required to give notice to the seller within a reasonable time. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS, supra note 286, § 402A comment m, made applicable by § 402B comment d. On the
other hand, the consumer must justifiably rely on the misrepresentation, id. § 402B com-
ment j, and the misrepresentation must concern a material fact relating to the character or
quality of the chattel. Id. comment g (specifically excluding "sales talk" and "puffing"). This
last limitation may significantly reduce the usefulness of this type of strict liability for mis-
representation because, as previously discussed, the attribution of an art work to a particu-
lar artist or time period may be classified as "puffing." See supra notes 60-65 and accompa-
nying text. Such an attribution would clearly seem to be "material," although under
warranty concepts it may be categorized as an opinion rather than a statement of fact.
289. Lonon, 217 Tenn. at 414-16, 423, 398 S.W.2d at 246-47, 250.
290. Now that the privity requirement for suing for breach of a warranty has largely been
reduced or eliminated, see, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-318 alternatives A, B, and C and comments 2 and
3 (eliminating privity to varying degrees), the primary relevant distinction between tort and
warranty doctrine seems to be whether liability may be disclaimed by the merchant. The
following description of a proposed strict liability theory is based in part on the notion of a
strict "claim" liability for representations made in advertising, as developed in Lewis, To-
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The policy underlying the creation of such a theory of strict lia-
bility would rely on the superior knowledge and expertise of the
art merchant. The premise is that the merchant is in a better posi-
tion than the purchaser to determine the authenticity of the art
work-whether by scientific tests, research, questioning of the
owner, or simply refraining from making unreliable claims as to
authenticity and attribution. In cases in which the merchant errs,
even if without fault, the merchant is also in a better position to
spread the costs among all the purchasers rather than imposing the
entire cost on a single buyer. The lower court in Weisz v. Parke-
Bernet Galleries, Inc.291 and the court in Menzel v. List 292 essen-
tially relied on this theory in finding for the plaintiff and imposing
the risks on the auction house or dealer. The theory of strict liabil-
ity may be particularly well suited to solving the problems of the
art market because of the high degree of uncertainty involved in
the identification of art works. The specialized skills required to
make an attribution combined with the ultimate uncertainty of
such attributions may place the merchant, who puts the art objects
into the stream of commerce, in the best position to bear the risks
of mistakes, whether avoidable or not, and to spread such costs
among all purchasers. In its application to the art market, such a
strict liability doctrine therefore would apply only in transactions
between an art merchant and a nonmerchant.295 One could adopt
ward a Theory of Strict "Claim" Liability: Warranty Relief for Advertising Representa-
tions, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 671 (1986). Lewis advocates that transactions between buyers and
sellers should be regulated by warranty law, although a form of strict liability should be
imposed on advertisers for much the same policy reasons that justified the imposition of
strict liability in the tort context. Id. at 691-95. A comprehensive review of liability for
representations concerning products and an argument for application of a single form of
strict liability for commercial loss caused by an advertiser's misrepresentations, even if with-
out fault, can be found in Shapo, supra note 285, at 1172-1203, 1251-85.
291. 67 Misc. 2d 1077, 325 N.Y.S.2d 576 (1971), rev'd, 77 Misc. 2d 80, 351 N.Y.S.2d 911
(1974). The trial court specifically referred to "a relationship between parties in which there
is a basic inequality of knowledge, expertness or economic power." 67 Misc. 2d at 1082, 325
N.Y.S.2d at 582.
292. 24 N.Y.2d 91, 98, 246 N.E.2d 742, 745, 298 N.Y.S.2d 979, 983 (1969).
293. Both the Michigan and New York statutes define an "art merchant" to include not
only an auctioneer but also the auctioneer's consignor or principal. MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN.
§ 442.321(1)(a) (West Supp. 1987); N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 11.01(2) (McKinney Supp.
1988). The intention of this inclusion is presumably to make the consignor or principal lia-
ble to the purchaser for failures of quality and title. Such liability to the purchaser is, of
course, justified. However, in transactions between the consignor or owner and the auction-
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the definitions given in the New York and Michigan statutes, with
perhaps some modifications, to determine which purchasers are to
be considered art merchants.294
This liability would depend primarily on the creation of an ex-
press warranty largely as defined in the New York and Michigan
statutes. These statutes provide that an express warranty is cre-
ated by any identification or description of an art work given by an
art merchant in a written instrument and is not negated or limited
because "any statement relevant to authorship is, or purports to
be, or is capable of being merely the seller's opinion. 29 5 This pro-
vision thus eliminates the defense that the statement is only the
seller's opinion or that the statement relates to something that
cannot be established and therefore must be classified as opinion
or "puffery," neither of which is actionable. However, this exten-
sion appears to apply only to statements of authorship and not to
other elements of an art work's attribution-for example, the date
and provenance of the object. It would seem that under a strict
liability doctrine, this limitation should be eliminated.
These statutes also permit the merchant to incorporate within
this warranty "the terminology. . and the meaning accorded to
such terminology by the customs and usage of the trade at the
time and in the locality where the sale . . . took place."2 6 The
nonmerchant thus is charged with understanding the technical
eer or dealer, the parties should not necessarily be considered as having equal bargaining
position, and the consignor or owner should therefore not be considered an "art merchant."
Owners and consignors traditionally are protected by the characterization of their relation-
ship to the dealer or auctioneer as a fiduciary or agency relationship. If, however, a unitary
theory based on strict liability for misrepresentation were to be adopted, then the determi-
nation of whether the owner or consignor should be considered an "art merchant" should be
made in the same way as would such a determination for the status of the purchaser.
294. In some situations, determining whether the purchaser has the status of an art
merchant may be difficult-for example, a museum curator purchasing art works outside the
area of his or her expertise or a major collector who does not "deal" in art but rather
purchases art primarily for its aesthetic pleasure. Nevertheless, the category of art merchant
should not be restricted overly because a museum or collector may have superior access to
expertise and information. Such sophisticated purchasers should be.encouraged to use avail-
able expertise rather than to ignore it in order to avoid assuming the risk of an incorrectly
attributed or authenticated work of art.
295. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 442.322(2)(a); N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 13.03(1).
Such a description of authorship is presumed to be part of the basis of the bargain, and the
purchaser therefore need not show separate reliance on the description.
296. MicH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 442.322(2)(b); N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 13.03(2).
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terms and trade usage employed in the art market. The policy no-
tions underlying the creation of a strict liability doctrine would
seem better served by imposing the duty on the art merchant to
explain these terms or simply to use plain language rather than
imposing the duty on the nonmerchant to understand technical
terms and trade usage.
The last significant issue that must be resolved is whether such a
warranty may be negated or limited. It seems clear that a dis-
claimer or negation of the warranty contained in a- place separate
from the description or attribution should not be effective. For ex-
ample, a disclaimer or limitation, which could easily be incorpo-
rated in the description but which appears instead in the front of
an auction catalog, should be deemed unreasonable and should fail
to negate any express warranty created by the description itself.
The New York and Michigan statutes also deem any negation or
disclaimer of this warranty to be unreasonable if the work of art is
proved to be a counterfeit or if an unqualified statement of author-
ship is proved to be false, mistaken, or erroneous at the time of
sale or exchange.29 True strict liability thus is imposed only if the
art work turns out to be a counterfeit. In the case of an incorrect
attribution, the art merchant is liable only if this inaccuracy has
previously been determined; the art merchant's duty thus extends
only to obtaining relevant scholarship and knowledge and not to
conducting research. 9 8 Such a limitation on the art merchant's lia-
bility for knowing what may, in fact, be "unknowable" may re-
present a realistic compromise in the allocation of risks.2 99 Never-
theless, when the art merchant can relatively easily qualify any
attribution with a "perhaps" or a "probable," one may posit that
297. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 442.323(3)(b), (c); N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 13.03(2).
298. The distinction between a counterfeit and an incorrect attribution seems to turn on
the fact that a counterfeit is a work of art "made or altered, with intent to deceive, in such
manner that it appears to have an authorship which it does not in fact possess." The term is
also "deemed to include any work of fine art made, altered or copied in such manner that it
appears to have an authorship which it does not in fact possess even though such work may
not have been made with intent to deceive." N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 13.01(6). The
Michigan statute employs similar but not identical language. MIcH. COMP. LAws ANN.
§ 442.321(1)(c). One may wonder whether, for example, a Roman statue that is a copy of a
Greek original and which may well have been made to deceive an ancient art patron would
be considered a "counterfeit" if mistakenly sold as a Greek statue.
299. See Shapo, supra note 285, at 1358-59.
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the extension of strict liability for an incorrect attribution is
justified.
The primary objection that can be raised to the application of
this theory concerns its fairness and economic utility in the context
of the art market. The auctioneer, in particular, might argue that
the buyer is able to purchase works more cheaply at auction and
thereby assumes the additional risk of a misattribution of the work
of art. When purchasing from a dealer who buys the work from the
owner, rather than taking it on consignment, and who therefore
acts as a seller on his or her own behalf, the buyer pays a premium
and shifts the risk to the dealer. By limiting the auctioneer's liabil-
ity, one can preserve a system of choices-the buyer who is risk
averse can buy from a dealer, whereas the buyer who wants a bar-
gain can assume the risk and buy from an auction house.
This dichotomy, however, is breaking down, and even the case
law, reflecting the realities, now often fails to make clear distinc-
tions among dealers, brokers, galleries, and auction houses when
confronting the art market. Furthermore, the truly unsophisticated
buyer probably is not even aware of this theoretical choice when
deciding to buy at an auction. In such a situation, the imposition
of strict warranty liability on the art merchant seems justified.300
Both proposed theories-one relying on agency principles and
the other on strict liability, whether based in tort for innocent mis-
representation or in contract for breach of warranty--would re-
present considerable protection for the unsophisticated purchaser
who participates in the art market. Both theoretical models may
also be criticized for simply not corresponding to the realities of
the marketplace. In the words of the New York appellate court in
Weisz v. Parke-Bernet Galleries, purchasers "will not . . . be
heard to complain that, in failing to act with the caution of one in
circumstances abounding with signals of caveat emptor, they made
a bad bargain."301 According to this view, any individual who un-
dertakes to enter into the arcane world of the art market-where
300. Another theoretical difficulty with a strict liability doctrine is whether it adequately
explains the relationship between the art merchant and the owner or consignor. Given the
high standard of duty owed by an agent to its principal, there is probably little necessity to
turn to strict liability for additional protection, except in the interest of creating a consis-
tent doctrine to regulate the different facets of the art market.
301. 77 Misc. 2d 80, 81, 351 N.Y.S.2d 911, 912 (N.Y. App. Term 1974).
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prices are high and information scant-must assume the risks in-
herent in such a transaction. Nonetheless, these very same circum-
stances should prompt a realization that the art market is an ac-
tive and vital segment of commercial transactions which requires
the formulation of a flexible and realistic yet also adequate model
for protection of those consumers who do venture into that
marketplace.
